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Abstract
Secure function computation has been thoroughly studied and optimized in the past decades.
We extend techniques used for secure computation to simulate arbitrary protocols involving a
mediator. The key feature of our notion of simulation is that it is bidirectional: not only
does the simulation produce only outputs that could happen in the original protocol, but the
simulation produces all such outputs. In a synchronous system, it can be shown that this
requirement can already be achieved by the standard notion of secure computation. However,
in an asynchronous system, new subtleties arise because the scheduler can influence the output.
We provide a construction that is secure if n > 4t, where t is the number malicious agents, which
is provably the best possible. We also show that our construction satisfies additional security
properties even if 3t < n ≤ 4t.
1 Introduction
In a distributed system, agents often want to be able to carry out a computation without revealing
any private information. There has been a great deal of work showing how and to what extent this
can be done. We briefly review the most relevant work here.
Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Widgerson [1988] (BGW from now on) showed that, if n > 3t, then every
function f of n inputs can be securely computed by n agents in a synchronous system with private
communication channels, where “securely computed” means that no coalition of at most t malicious
agents can either (a) prevent the honest agents from correctly computing the output of f given
their inputs (assuming some fixed inputs for malicious agents who do not provide inputs) or (b)
learn anything about the inputs of the honest agents (beyond what can be concluded from the
output of f). The notion of an agent “not learning anything” is formalized by comparing what
happens in the actual computation to what could have happened had there been a trusted third
party (which we here call a mediator) who will calculate f(x1, . . . , xn) after being given the input
xi by agent i, for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, roughly speaking, the malicious agents do not learn anything
∗Supported in part by NSF grant IIS-1703846.
†Supported in part by NSF grants IIS-1703846 and IIS-1718108, ARO grant W911NF-17-1-0592, and a grant from
Open Philanthropy.
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if the distribution of outputs in the actual computation could have also resulted in the computation
with a mediator if the malicious agents had given the appropriate input to the mediator.
Ben-Or, Canetti and Goldreich [1993] (BCG from now on) proved analogous results in the asyn-
chronous case. Asynchrony raises new subtleties. For example, agent i cannot tell if the fact
that he has received no messages from another agent j (which means that i cannot use j’s input
in computing f) is due to the fact that j is malicious or that its messages have not yet arrived.
Roughly speaking, when defining secure function computation in an asynchronous setting, BCG
require that for every scheduler σe and set T of malicious agents, no matter what the agents in
T do, the resulting distribution over outputs could have also resulted in the computation with a
mediator if the malicious agents had given the appropriate input to the mediator.
BCG show that, in asynchronous systems, if n > 4t, the malicious agents cannot prevent the honest
agents from correctly computing the output of f given their inputs, nor can the malicious agents
learn anything about the inputs of the honest agents. Ben-Or, Kelmer and Rabin [1994] (BKR
from now on) then showed if we are willing to tolerate a small probability ǫ > 0 that the agents do
not correctly compute f or that the malicious agents learn something, then we can achieve this if
n > 3t. BCG and BKR also prove matching lower bounds for their results, showing that we really
need to have n > 4t (resp., n > 3t).
We can view secure function computation as a one-round interaction with a trusted mediator: each
agent sends its input to the mediator, the mediator waits until it receives enough inputs, applies f
to these inputs (again, replacing missing inputs with a default value), and sends the output back
to the agents, who then output it. We generalize BCG and BKR’s results for function computation
to a more general setting. Specifically, we want to simulate arbitrary interactions with a mediator,
not just function computation. Also, unlike previous approaches, we want the simulation to be
“bidirectional”: the set of possible output distributions that arise with the mediator must be the
same as those that arise without the mediator, even in the presence of malicious parties. More
precisely, we show that, given a protocol ~π for n agents and a protocol πd for a mediator, we can
construct a protocol ~π′ such that for all sets T of fewer than n/4 malicious agents, the following
properties hold:
(a) For all protocols ~τ ′T for the malicious agents and all schedulers σ
′
e in the setting without the
mediator, there exists a protocol ~τT for the agents in T and a scheduler σe in the setting with
the mediator such that, for all input profiles ~x, the output distribution in the computation
with ~π′, ~τ ′, and σ′e with input ~x is the same as the output distribution with ~π+πd, ~τ , and σe
with input ~x.
(b) For all protocols ~τT for the malicious agents and all schedulers σe in the setting with the me-
diator, there exists a protocol ~τ ′T for the agents in T and a scheduler σ
′
e in the setting without
a mediator such that, for all input profiles ~x, the output distribution in the computation with
~π′, ~τ ′, and σ′e with input ~x is the same as the output distribution with ~π+πd, ~τ , and σe with
input ~x.
This result implies that arbitrary distributed protocols that work in the presence of a trusted
mediator can be compiled to protocols that work without a mediator, as long as there are less than
n/4 malicious agents. And, just as BKR, if we allow a probability ǫ of error, we can get this result
while tolerating up to n/3 malicious agents. BCG proved the analogue of (a) for secure function
computation, which is enough for security purposes: if there is any bad behavior in the protocol
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without the mediator, this bad behavior must already exist in the protocol with the mediator.
However, (b) also seems like a natural requirement; if a protocol satisfies this property, then all
behaviors in the protocol with the mediator also occur in the protocol without the mediator.
Clearly, the results of BCG and BKR are special cases of our result. However, in general, our
results do not follow from those of BCG/BKR, as is shown in Section 3.3. Specifically, the results
of BCG/BKR do not give us property (b), since the outcome can depend on the behavior of the
scheduler. For example, consider a protocol for two agents and a mediator m in which each agent
sends its input to the mediator, the mediator m sends to each agent the first message it receives,
and each agent outputs whatever they receive from the mediator. Let σie be the scheduler that
delivers the message from agent i first, for i = 1, 2. It is easy to check that if the agents have inputs
0 and 1, respectively, and play with mediator σ1e , then they both output 0, while if they play with
σ2e , then they both output 1. This means that, unlike secure function computation, even if all the
agents are honest, the distribution over the agents’ outputs can depend on the scheduler’s protocol,
not just the agents’ inputs.
Even though our results do not follow from those of BCG/BKR, our proofs very much follow the
lines of those of BCG/BKR. However, there are some new subtleties that arise in our setting. In
particular, as the example above shows, when we try to implement the setting with the mediator, the
agents must somehow keep track of the scheduler’s possible behaviors. Doing this adds nontrivial
complexity to our argument.
Besides the main result, we also show that our protocol without the mediator has two additional
security properties, which may be of independent interest. Specifically, we show that the following
two properties hold for coalitions of malicious agents of size at most t < n/3.
(P1) The only way malicious agents can disrupt the computation is by preventing honest agents
from terminating; if an honest agent terminates, then its output is correct.
(P2) If 2t + 1 or more honest agents terminate, then all honest agents terminate. That is, either
all the honest agents terminate or a nontrivial number of honest agents (more than n − 2t)
do not terminate.
If we allow an ǫ probability of error, we get analogous results if we have n > 2t rather than n > 3t.
We remark that these two properties are in fact also satisfied by BCG’s and BKR’s implementations,
but they do not prove this (or even state the properties explicitly).
Our interest in these properties stems in part from a game-theoretic variant of the problem that we
consider a companion paper [Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern 2019] where agents get utility
for various outcomes, and, in addition to honest and malicious agents, there are rational agents,
who will deviate from a protocol if (and only if) it is to their benefit to do so. We also assume
that honest agents can leave “wills”, so that if sufficiently many honest agents do not terminate,
the remaining agents will be punished. The second property above guarantees that either all the
honest agents terminate, or sufficiently many of them do not terminate to guarantee that rational
agents will not try to prevent honest agents from terminating (due to the threat of punishment).
The first property above guarantees that if all the honest agents terminate, their output will be
correct. Thus, using these results allows us to obtain results stronger than those of this paper in
the game-theoretic setting.
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The focus of this paper is on upper bounds. Since our algorithms have the same upper bounds as
those of BCG and BKR, despite the results of BCG and BKR being special cases of our results,
and BCG and BKR prove lower bounds that match their upper bonds on the number of malicious
agents that can be tolerated, we immediately get lower bounds that match our upper bounds from
the results of BCG and BKR.
2 The Model
The model used throughout this paper is that of an asynchronous network in which every pair of
agents can communicate through a private and reliable communication channel. For most of our
results, we assume that all messages sent through any of these channels are eventually received,
but they can be delayed arbitrarily. The order in which these messages are received is determined
by the environment (also called the scheduler). The scheduler also chooses the order in which the
agents are scheduled. For some of the results of this paper, we drop the condition that all messages
must be eventually delivered. We call these more general schedulers relaxed schedulers.
Whenever a agent is scheduled, it reads all the messages that it has received since the last time
it was scheduled, sends a (possibly empty) sequence of messages, and then performs some internal
actions. We assume that the scheduler does not deliver any message or schedule other agents
during an agent’s turn. Thus, although agent i does not send all its messages simultaneously when
it is scheduled, they are sent atomically, in the sense that no other agent is scheduled while i is
scheduled, nor are any messages delivered while i is scheduled. Note that the atomicity assumption
is really a constraint on the scheduler’s protocol.
More precisely, consider the following types of events:
• sch(i): Agent i gets scheduled.
• snd(µ, j, i): Agent i sends a message µ to agent j.
• rec(µ, j, i): Message µ sent by j is received by i. The message µ must be one sent at an earlier
time to i that was not already received.
• comp(v, i): Agent i locally computes value v.
• out(s, i): Agent i outputs string s.
• done(i): i is done sending messages and performing computations (for now).
For simplicity, we assume that agents can output only strings in {0, 1}∗. Note that all countable
sets can be encoded by such strings, and thus we can freely talk about players being able to output
any element of any countable set (for instance, elements of a finite field Fq) by assuming that they
are actually outputting an encoding of these elements. We also assume that at most one event
occurs at each time step. Let h(m) denote a global history up to time m: a sequence that starts
with an input profile ~x, followed by the ordered sequence of events that have occurred up to and
including time m. We assume that the only events between events of the form sch(i) and done(i)
are ones of the form snd(µ, j, i) and comp(v, i). This captures our atomicity assumption. We do not
include explicit events that correspond to reading messages. (Nothing would change if we included
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them; they would simply clutter the notation.) Message delivery (which is assumed to be under
the control of the scheduler) occurs at times between when agents are scheduled. We can also
consider the subsequence involving agent i, namely, i’s initial state, followed by events of the form
sch(i), snd(·, ·, i), comp(·, i), rec(·, ·, i), and done(i). This subsequence is called i’s local history.
We drop the argument m if can be deduced from context or if it is not relevant (for instance, when
we consider the local history of an agent after a particular event).
Agent i moves only after a sch(i) event. What it does (in particular, the order in which i sends
messages) is determined by i’s protocol, which is a function of i’s local history. The scheduler moves
after an action of the form done(i) or rec(·, ·, i). It is convenient to assume that the scheduler is
also running a protocol, which is also a function of its local history. Since the scheduler does not see
the contents of messages, we can take its history to be identical to h(m), except that the messages
are removed, although we do track the index of the messages delivered; that is, we replace events of
the form snd(µ, i, j) and rec(µ, i, j) by snd(i, j) and rec(i, j, ℓ), where ℓ is the index of the message
sent by i to j in h(m). For instance, rec(i, j, 2) means that the second message sent by i to j was
delivered to j. Note that the scheduler does see events of the form done(i); indeed, these are signals
to the scheduler that it can move, since i’s turn is over. Since we view the agents (and the mediator)
as sending messages atomically, in the sequel, we talk about an agent’s (or the mediator’s) turn.
An agent’s kth turn takes place the kth time it is scheduled. During its turn, the agent sends a
block of messages and performs some local computation.
It is more standard in the literature to assume that agents perform at most one action when they
are scheduled. We can view this a constraint on agents’ protocols. A single-action protocol for
agent i is one where agent i sends at most one message before performing the done(i) action. As
we show in Section 3.7, we could have restricted to single-action protocols with no loss of generality
as far as our results go; allowing agents to perform a sequence of actions atomically just makes the
exposition easier.
Even though it might appear that malicious agents and the scheduler act independently, we show
in our companion paper [Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern 2019, Section A.1] that we can
assume without loss of generality that they coordinate their actions (i.e., that they are all under
the control of a single entity, which we take here to be the scheduler).
Definition 1. An adversary is a triple (T, ~σT , σe), consisting of a set T of malicious agents, the
protocol ~τT used by the agents in T , and a protocol σe for the scheduler. An adversary where the
scheduler is relaxed is a relaxed adversary.
In this paper, we consider protocols that involve a mediator, typically denoted d, using a protocol
denoted πd. In protocols that involve a mediator, we assume that honest agents’ strategies are
always such that the honest agents communicate only with the mediator, not with each other.
However, since malicious agents can deviate, they can communicate with each other. As far as the
scheduler is concerned, the mediator is like any other agent, so the scheduler (and the mediator’s
protocol) determine when the mediator sends and receives messages. However, the mediator is
never malicious, and thus never deviates from its announced protocol.
We deal only with bounded protocols, where there is a bound N on the number of messages that
an honest agent sends. Of course, there is nothing to prevent malicious agents from spamming the
mediator and sending an arbitrary number of messages. We assume that the mediator reads at
most N messages from each agent i, ignoring any further messages sent by i.
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For our results involving termination, specifically, (P2), it is critical that players know when the
mediator stops sending messages. For these results, we restrict the honest agents and the mediator
to using protocols that have the following canonical form: Using a canonical protocol, each honest
agent tags its ℓth message with label ℓ and all honest agents are guaranteed to send at most N
messages regardless of their inputs or the random bits they use. Whenever the mediator receives
a message from an agent i, it checks its tag ℓ; if ℓ > N or if the mediator has already received
a message from i with tag ℓ, it ignores the message. The mediator is guaranteed to eventually
terminate. Whenever this happens, it sends a special “STOP” message to all agents and halts.
Whenever an honest agent receives a “STOP” message, it terminates.
Even though canonical protocols have a bound N on the number of messages that honest agents
and the mediator can send, the mediator’s local history in a canonical protocol can be arbitrarily
long, since it can be scheduled an arbitrary number of times. We conjecture that, in general, since
the message space is finite, the expected number of messages required to simulate the mediator is
unbounded. However, we can do better if the mediator’s protocol satisfies two additional properties.
Roughly speaking, the first property says that the mediator can send messages only either at
its first turn or in response to an agent’s message; the second property says that the mediator
ignores empty turns, that is, turns where it does not receive or send messages. Thus, the second
property implies that the mediator cannot send a message after receiving a message that describes
how many empty turns there have been since the last time the mediator sent a message. More
precisely, the first property says that whenever the mediator πd is scheduled with history hd, then
if hd 6= ( ) (i.e., if hd is not the initial history) or if the mediator has not received any messages
in hd since the last time it was scheduled, then πd(hd) = done(d). The second property says
that πd(hd) = πd(h
′
d), where h
′
d is the result of removing consecutive (done(d), sch(d)) pairs in
hd (e.g., if hd = (sch(d), snd (µ, j, d), done(d), sch(d), done(d), rec(µ
′, i, d), sch(d), done(d), sch(d)),
then h′d = (sch(d), snd(µ, j, d), done (d), rec(µ
′, i, d), sch(d))). In Section 4.4, we show that if the
mediator uses a responsive protocol πd that can be represented using a curcuit with c gates, then
we can simulate any protocol ~π + πd in such a way that the expected number of messages sent by
honest players during the simulation is polynomial in n and N and linear in c.
3 Secure Computation in Interactive Settings
3.1 The BGW/BCG notion of secure computation
Secure computation is concerned with jointly computing a function f on n variables, where the ith
input is known only to agent i. For instance, if we want to compute the average salary of the people
from the state of New York, then n would be New York’s population, the input xi is i’s salary, and
f(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
n
i=1
xi∑
xi 6=0
1 . (For the denominator we count only people who are actually working.)
Ideally, a secure computation protocol that computes f would be a protocol in which each agent i
outputs f(x1, . . . , xn) and gains no information about the inputs xj for j 6= i. In our example, this
amounts to not learning other people’s salaries.
Typically, we are interested in performing secure computation in a setting where some of the agents
might be malicious and not follow the protocol. In particular, they might not give any information
about their input or might just pretend that they have a different input (for instance, they can lie
about their salary). What output do we want the secure computation of f to produce in this case?
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To make precise what we want, we use notation introduced by BGW and BCG.
Let ~x be a vector of n components; let C be a subset of [n] (where we use the notation [n] to denote
the set {1, . . . , n}, as is standard); let ~xC denote the vector obtained by projecting ~x onto the
indices of C; and if ~z is a vector of length |C|, let ~x/(C,~z) denote the vector obtained by replacing
the entries of x indexed by C with ~z. Given a set C of indices, a default value, which we take here
to be 0, and a function f , we take fC to be the function results from applying f , but taking the
inputs of the agents not in C to be 0; that is, fC(~x) = f(~x/(C,~0)). Roughly speaking, if only the
agents in C provide inputs, we want the output of the secure computation to be fc(~x).
What about agents who lie about their inputs? A malicious agent i who lies about his input xi
and pretends to have some other input yi is indistinguishable from an honest agent who has yi as
his actual input. We can capture this lie using a function L : D|T | → D|T |, where D is the domain
of the inputs and T is the set of malicious agents. The function L encodes the inputs malicious
agents pretend to have given their actual inputs. BCG require that all the honest agent output
the same value and that the output has the form (C, fC(~y)), where ~y = ~x/(T,L(~xT )). They allow C
to depend on ~xT , since malicious agents can influence the choice of C. They also allow the choice
of C and the function L to be randomized. Since the choice of L and C can be correlated, L and
C are assumed to take as input a common random value r ∈ R, where R denotes the domain of
random inputs. That is, C = c(~xT , r) for some function c, and the malicious agents with actual
input ~xT pretend that their input is L(~xT , r).
BCG place no requirements on the output of malicious agents, but they do want the inputs of
honest agents to remain as secret as possible. Hence, in an ideal scenario, the outputs of malicious
agents can depend only on ~xT , fC(~y), and possibly some randomization. Taking Oi to denote the
output function of a malicious agent i, we can now give BCG’s definitions.
Definition 2. An ideal t-adversary A is a tuple (T, c, L,O) consisting of a set T ⊆ [n] of malicious
agents with |T | ≤ t and three randomized functions c : D|T | ×R → P([n]) with |c(~z, r)| ≥ n− t for
all input profiles ~z and r, L : D|T | × R → D|T | and ~O : D|T | × D × R → ({0, 1}∗)|T |. The ideal
output ~ρ of A given function f , input profile ~x, and a value r ∈ R is
ρi(~x,A, r; f) =
{
(c(~xT , r), fc(~xT ,r)(~x/(T,L(~xT ,r)))) if i 6∈ T
Oi(~xT , fc(~xT ,r)(~x/(T,L(~xT ,r))), r) if i ∈ T.
Let ~ρ(~x,A; f) denote the distribution induced over outputs by the protocol profile ~ρ on input x given
the ideal t-adversary A. Note that an ideal t-adversary is somewhat different from the adversary
as defined in Definition 1, although they are related, as we show in Section 3.3. We use variants of
A to denote both types of adversary.
We can now give the BCG definition of secure computation. Let ~π(~x,A) be the distribution of
outputs when running protocol ~π on input ~x with adversary A = (T, ~τT , σe).
Definition 3 (Secure computation). Let f : Dn → D be a function on n variables and ~π a protocol
for n agents. Protocol ~π t-securely computes f if, for every adversary A′ = (T, ~τT , σe), the following
properties hold:
SC1. For all input profiles ~x, all honest agents terminate with probability 1.
SC2. There exists an ideal t-adversary A′ = (T, c, L, ~O) such that, for all input profiles ~x, ~ρ(~x,A′; f)
and ~π(~x,A) are identically distributed.
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Note that BCG just require that some ideal t-adversary A gives the same distribution over the the
outputs of π. This captures the idea that all ways that malicious agents can deviate are modeled
by adversaries. Also note that SC1 follows from SC2 if we view non-termination as a special kind
of output.
BCG prove the following result:
Theorem 1. Given n and t such that n > 4t and a function f : Dn → D, there exists a protocol
~πf that t-securely computes f .
The construction of ~πf , which is sketched in the next section, is of critical importance for this
paper, since most of the primitives used in this construction are also used in ours.
3.2 The BCG construction
To explain the BCG construction, we must first review the tools used by BCG, specifically, broad-
cast, consensus, verifiable secret sharing (VSS), circuit computation, accumulative sets, agreement
on a core set, and random polynomial generation. (Accumulative sets and agreement on a core set
were introduced by BCG; the other tools are older.)
3.2.1 Broadcast
A broadcast protocol involves a sender who sends a message µ to all agents in such a way that all
honest agents receive the same message. (Although we talk about “a broadcast protocol”, this is
really a joint protocol, that is, a protocol for each agent. Given a joint protocol ~P , we use Pi to
denote i’s part of the protocol. The sender’s protocol is different from those of the other agents.
The sender has input µ, the message to be shared; the other agents have no input.) Moreover, if the
sender is honest, the message received by an agent i must be the message µ that the sender sent.
More precisely, a broadcast protocol invoked by a sender with input µ must satisfy the following
properties in all histories:
• If an honest agent terminates broadcast with output µ′, then all honest agents eventually
terminate broadcast with output µ′.
• If the sender is honest, then all honest agents eventually terminate broadcast and output µ.
Bracha [1984] provides a broadcast protocol that tolerates up to t malicious agents in asynchronous
systems if n > 3t.
3.2.2 Consensus
In a consensus protocol, each agent i starts with an initial preference yi ∈ {0, 1} and must output
a value x ∈ {0, 1} such that the following properties are satisfied in all histories:
• All honest agents terminate with probability 1.
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• If one honest agent terminates and outputs x, then all honest agents terminate and output
x.
• If all honest agents have the same initial value y, then if an honest agent i terminates the
protocol, i outputs y.
Abraham, Dolev and Halpern [2008] provide a consensus protocol that is t-resilient in asynchronous
systems if n > 3t.
3.2.3 Verifiable secret sharing
In a verifiable secret sharing protocol, a sender starts out with some secret s that it wants to
share. VSS consists of a pair of protocols (
−−→
VSSsh,
−−→
VSSrec), commonly referred to as the sharing
protocol and the reconstruction protocol, and a designated agent, the sender, such that the following
properties hold:
• If the sender is honest, then every honest agent i will eventually complete VSSshi .
• If an honest agent i completes VSSshi , then all honest agents j eventually complete VSS
sh
j
and VSSrecj .
• The output of VSSshi is called i’s share of the secret. There is a unique value s
′ such that if
each honest agent i runs VSSreci with input i’s share of the secret, then all the honest agents j
will complete VSSrecj , and will output the same value s
′, no matter what the malicious agents
do.
• If the sender is honest, then s′ = s (the sender’s secret).
• If the sender is honest and no honest agent i has begun executing VSSreci , then the malicious
agents cannot guess s with probability > 1/M (where M is the cardinality of the space of
possible secrets).
With VSS, just as with the broadcast protocol, the sender’s protocol is different from that of the
other agents; only the sender has the secret s. Whenever a recipient i receives a message µ from the
sender, it invokes VSSshi with input µ and outputs its share of the secret, which becomes the input
to VSSreci . Even though we require each agent i to output the same value s
′ after runing VSSreci ,
a simple modification of
−−→
VSSrec allows a single agent to learn the secret, without any other agent
getting any additional information: If we want only i to learn the secret, all the agents send their
shares to i, and i simulates the computation of
−−→
VSSrec locally. (This depends on the assumption
that the only input to VSSrecj is j’s share of the secret, and that it suffices for i to learn the shares
of the honest agents in order to recover the secret.) However, no other agents learn anything about
the secret (since all they have is their share of the secret).
BCG provide a VSS protocol in an asynchronous setting that is t resilient as long as n > 4t. BKR
showed that if n > 3t, then for all ǫ > 0, there exists a t-resilient protocol that achieves the VSS
properties in asynchronous systems with probability at least 1 − ǫ. More precisely, their protocol
has the property that if some honest agent terminates, then all honest agents terminate and all the
properties above hold, and some honest agent terminates with probability at least 1− ǫ.
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3.2.4 Accumulative sets
Suppose that we have a global clock, initialized to 0. We do not assume that agents have access
to the global clock. An accumulative set is a function U(h,m) from histories and global time to
sets such that U(h,m) ⊇ U(h,m′) if m ≥ m′. (Intuitively, U(h,m) consists of the elements of U at
time m in history h.)
Definition 4. Given M1,M2 ∈ N with M1 ≤ M2, a tuple (U1, . . . , Un) of accumulative subsets of
N (one for each agent) is (M1,M2)-uniform in history h if, for every agent i that is honest in h,
• Ui(h,m) ⊆ {1, . . . ,M2} for all times m ≥ 0;
• there exists a time mhi such that |Ui(h,m
h
i )| ≥M1;
• for all agents j that are honest in h, there exists a time mhi,j such that Ui(h,m) = Uj(h,m)
for all m ≥ mhi,j.
To see how (M1,M2)-uniform accumulative sets are used, suppose that each agent i in a system of
n agents has a secret si. The n agents each invoke t-resilient VSS concurrently in a system with t
malicious agents and n > 3t, with agent i acting as the sender with secret si in its invocation of
VSS. Let Ui(h,m) consist of those agents j for which i has terminated the sharing phase of the VSS
initiated by j by time m in history h. Clearly Ui is an accumulative set. We claim that (U1, . . . , Un)
is (n − t, n)-uniform. Clearly, Ui(h,m) ⊆ {1, . . . , n} for all times m by construction. Since there
at most t malicious agents in each history and the VSS scheme is t-resilient, the properties of
VSS guarantee that each honest agent i will eventually complete the VSS initiated by each honest
agent j, which means j is included in Ui(h,m) for some m, and thus there must exist a time m
h
i
such that |Ui(h,m
h
i )| ≥ n − t. Since Ui(h,m) is finite, there must come a time (m
h
i )
∗ such that
Ui(h,m
′) = Ui(h, (m
h
i )
∗) for all m′ ≥ (mhi )
∗. Let mhi,j = max((m
h
i )
∗, (mhj )
∗). The properties of VSS
guarantee that j′ ∈ Ui(h,m
h
i,j) iff j
′ ∈ Uj(h,m
h
i,j).
3.2.5 Agreement on a core set
An agreement on a core set (ACS) protocol is given as input natural numbers M1 and M2. Each
agent i is also assumed to have access to an accumulative set Ui. If the tuple (U1, . . . , Un) is
(M1,M2)-uniform with respect to the histories of the ACS protocol, then the following properties
must hold:
• All honest agents must eventually complete the ACS protocol.
• If an honest agent i completes the protocol at time m, then it output a set Ci ⊆ Ui(m) such
that |Ci| ≥M1.
• If i and j are honest, then Ci = Cj .
Thus, all honest agents running an ACS protocol must output the same set; this set is called the
core set. We denote by ACSi(Ui,M1,M2) agent i’s invocation of the ACS protocol with inputs M1
and M2 relative to accumulative set Ui. Note that although the notation suggests that Ui is the
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input to ACSi, the protocol may actually check Ui several times while it is running, and Ui may
be different each time it is checked, since Ui may updated in parallel with ACSi.
BCG provide an ACS protocol that is t-resilient in asynchronous systems if n > 3t.
3.2.6 Circuit computation
Another key primitive that we use is circuit computation. Let (
−−→
VSSsh,
−−→
VSSrec) be a VSS scheme,
and let f : FNp → Fp be a circuit with N inputs consisting only of addition and multiplication
gates. Suppose that each agent i has shares xi1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
N of secrets x1, . . . , xN ∈ Fp respectively
(where the secrets are computed using (
−−→
VSSsh,
−−→
VSSrec)). A circuit computation of f (relative to
(
−−→
VSSsh,
−−→
VSSrec)), denoted CC(f) (we suppress the dependence on (
−−→
VSSsh,
−−→
VSSrec) from now on)
has the following properties. We assume that there is an input x1, . . . , xN such that each agent i
has shares xi1, . . . , x
i
N of x1, . . . , xN . Agent i’s component of the protocol, denoted CCi(f), is given
the inputs xi1, x
i
2, . . . , x
N
i and computes a single output yi, such that the following properties hold:
• yi is i’s share of f(x1, . . . , xN ) (relative to (
−−→
VSSsh,
−−→
VSSrec)).
• After running CCj(f) with inputs x
j
1, . . . , x
j
N (but before running the reconstruction protocol−−→
VSSrec), no malicious agent j has any information about the shares xil of an honest agent i,
the values x1, . . . , xN , or f(X1, . . . , xN ) beyond what it had before running CCj(f), even if
all the malicious agents pool their information.
• Even after honest agents run
−−→
VSSrec, no malicious agent j can guess the values of the shares
xil of an honest agents i or the the secrets x1, . . . , xN any better than it could before running
CCj(f) if it were given f(x1, . . . , xN ).
Simply put, a circuit computation protocol CC allows agents to compute their share of the output
of an arithmetic circuit given their shares of the circuit’s inputs, without revealing any information.
Since it is well known that every function f : DN → D can be represented by a circuit f ′ : FNp → Fp
for a prime p ≥ |D| (viewing the elements of D as the first |D| elements of Fp), if we can define
a protocol CC(f) for all arithmetic circuits, then we can define a protocol CC(f) for all functions
f : DN → D. This is especially important in the next section, where we use CC to compute
functions whose inputs and outputs are local histories.
BCG provide an implementation of CC(f) for all arithmetic circuits f relative to the VSS protocol
that they provide that is t-resilient in asynchronous systems as long as n > 4t; given ǫ > 0, BKR
provide an implementation of CC(f) for all arithmetic circuits relative to the VSS protocol that
they provide that is t-resilient in asynchronous systems and has at most an ǫ probability of error
(i.e., there is a probability ǫ that agents remain in deadlock or the output of the computation will
not be the appropriate share of the circuit’s output) as long as n > 3t.
We can assume without loss of generality that CC can handle randomized functions. That is, if
there is a protocol CC(f) to securely compute every deterministic function f : DN → D, then there
is a protocol CC(f) to securely compute every randomized function f : DN → D. A randomized
function f : DN → D can be viewed as a deterministic function once it is given sufficiently many
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random bits, that is, it can be identified with a deterministic function f : DN × {0, 1}N
′
→ D
for N ′ sufficiently large. Using ACS, VSS, and (deterministic) CC, the agents can easily compute
shares for N ′ random bits as follows.
1. Each agent i chooses a random bit bi and shares it using VSS.
2. Using ACS, the agents agree on a common set C consisting of at least t + 1 agents who
correctly shared a bit bi at step 1. Set b := ⊕i∈Cbi (where ⊕ denotes sum mod 2).
3. Each agent i computes its share of b using CC.
If n > 2t, then there are at least t+ 1 honest agents, so each honest agent will get shares from at
least t+ 1 agents. Since the set of t+ 1 agents agreed on using ACS contains at least one honest
agent, the bit b must be truly random.
We can also assume without loss of generality that whenever an honest agent terminates a CC
computation of some function f(x1, . . . , xN ), even in the presence of at most t malicious agents,
at least n − 2t other honest agents i have computed their share yi of f(x1, . . . , xN ). This can
be ensured by having an honest agent i send a Ready message to all agents when it finishes the
conputation of yi, and terminating the CC procedure when it receives n − t Ready messages. If
there are at most t malicious agents, if an agent receives n− t Ready messages, at least n− 2t are
from honest agents who genuinely computed their own share. This property will be critical later,
since it guarantees that sufficiently many honest agents are running the protocol at roughly the
same pace.
3.2.7 Construction of ~πf
Using the primitives sketched above, BCG gave a construction of ~πf . At the high level, the
construction proceeds as follows: for ~πf :
1. Each agent i shares its input using VSS.
2. Agents agree on a core set C ⊆ [n] with |C| ≥ n− t using an ACS procedure with parameters
M1 = n− t and M2 = n, where the accumulative set Ui of agent i is the set of agents j such
that i has terminated the VSS invoked by j at step 1.
3. Each agent i computes its share of fC(~x) using CC, where i’s input for the jth input gate is
i’s share of xj if j ∈ C; otherwise it is 0.
4. Each agent i sends its share of fC(~x) to each other agent j, then uses the shares received
from other agents to reconstruct fC(~x) using VSS.
5. Each agent i outputs (C, fC(~x)).
3.3 Secure computation and mediators
Even though it is not explicitly proven by BCG, their construction of ~πf satisfies an additional
property that we call SC3, which is essentially a converse of SC2.
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SC3. For all ideal t-adversaries A = (T, c, L, ~O), there exists an adversary A′ = (T, ~τT , σe) such
that, for all input profiles ~x, ~ρ(~x,A; f) and ~π(~x,A′) are identically distributed.
Lemma 1. Given a function f : Dn → D, protocol ~πf satisfies SC3.
Proof. Suppose that A is deterministic (i.e., c, L, and ~O do not depend on the random string r).
Given ~xT , let C = c(~xT ) and ~y = L(~xT ) (note that we have dropped the r input to both functions
since both are independent of r). Consider the protocol ~τT such that, if the agents in T have input
~xT , τi consists of i running πi with input yi, where ~yT = L(~xT ), except that if i was supposed to
output (S, z) (note that all outputs of honest agents are of this form, since the ideal output has
this form, and πf securely computes f) it outputs Oi(~xT , z) instead. Suppose that the scheduler
delays messages to and from players in C¯ until all others players terminate, and that it delivers
messages in such a way that all players in C terminate all instances of VSS invoked by a player
in C before they receive any other messages. The properties of the ACS protocol guarantee that,
in this case, the core set computed by honest players will be C. It follows from the construction
of ~τT that ~ρ(~x,A) and ~π(~x, T, ~τT , σe) are identically distributed. If A is randomized, τT works the
same way except that it chooses C, ~yT , and ~OT by sampling from the same distribution that r is
sampled from.
We next show how secure computation relates to simulating a mediator. Consider the following
protocol ~τ f + τ fd for n players and a mediator: Agents send their inputs to the mediator the first
time that they are scheduled. The mediator waits until it has received a valid input from all agents
in a subset C of agents with |C| ≥ n − t. The mediator then computes y = fC(~x) and sends each
agent the pair (C, y). When the agents receive a message from the mediator, they output that
message and terminate.
Clearly ~τ f + τ fd satisfies SC1. It is easy to see that it also satisfies SC2: Given a set T of malicious
agents, a deterministic protocol profile ~τT for the malicious agents, and a deterministic scheduler
σe, define L(~x, r) to be whatever the malicious agents send to the mediator with input ~x, let c(~x) be
the set of agents from whom the mediator has received a message the first time it is scheduled after
having received a message from a least n− t agents (given σe, ~τT , and input ~x), and let O(~x) be the
output function that malicious agents use in ~τ f + τ fd (note that they receive a single message with
the output of the computation, so their output depends only on ~x, ~τT , and σe). Clearly SC2 holds
with this choice of t-ideal adversary. Randomized functions ~τT and σe can be viewed as resulting
from sampling random bits r according to some distribution and then running deterministically;
the protocols c, h, and O can sample r from the same distribution and then proceed as above with
respect to the deterministic ~τT (r) and σe(r).
The protocol ~τ f + τ fd satisfies SC3 as well. Given A = (T, c, L,O), the definition of ~τT and σe is
straightforward: the agents in T choose a random input r ∈ R and then each agent i ∈ T sends
L(xi, r) to the mediator. The scheduler σe delivers all messages from the agents in c(~xT , r) first,
and then schedules the mediator. It then delivers all the other messages.
Since both ~τ f + τ fd and ~π
f satisfy SC2 and SC3, for all adversaries A, there exists an adversary A′
(resp., for all adversaries A′ there exists an adversary A) such that (~τ f + τ fd )(~x,A) and ~π
f (~x,A′)
are identically distributed.
Unfortunately, given a protocol ~πd for the mediator, there might not exist a function f such that
SC2 and SC3 hold, as the example given in the introduction (where the mediator sends to the agents
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the first message it receives) shows. Note that, in this example, the output of the agents is not a
function of their input profile, there is no function f for which SC2 and SC3 hold. Nevertheless,
we are still interested in securely computing the output of the protocol with the mediator. That
is, we are interested in getting analogues to SC2 and SC3 for arbitrary interactive protocols.
Definition 5. Protocol ~π′ t-bisimulates ~π if the following two properties hold:
(a) For all adversaries A = (T, ~τT , σe) with |T | ≤ t, there exists an adversary A
′ = (T, ~τ ′T , σ
′
e)
such that for all input profiles ~x, ~π(~x,A) and ~π′(~x,A′) are identically distributed.
(b) For all adversaries A′ = (T, ~τ ′T , σ
′
e) with |T | ≤ t, there exists an adversary A = (T, ~τT , σe)
such that all input profiles ~x, ~π(~x,A) and ~π′(~x,A′) are identically distributed.
Note that the first clause is analogous to SC2, while the second clause is analogous to SC3. There is
no clause analogous to SC1 since we allow agents not to terminate. In any case, since we can view
non-termination as a special type of output (i.e., we can view an agent that does not terminate as
outputting ⊥), so SC2 already guarantees that non-termination happens with the same probability
in ~π′ and ~π (In the setting of BGW, since all functions terminate, with this viewpoint, SC2 implies
SC1, a point already made by Canetti [1996].)
Our earlier discussion proves the following proposition:
Proposition 1. ~πf t-bisimulates ~τ f + τ fd if n > 4t.
3.4 Beyond secure computation
We view t-bisumulation as capturing the essence of secure computation, as defined by BCG (and
others). However, there are two additional properties that we need for the results of our companion
paper [Abraham, Dolev, Geffner, and Halpern 2019], which we believe are of independent interest.
Both of them are in fact satisfied by πf , although BCG do not discuss them.
To understand the first property, note that Proposition 1 guarantees that πf t-bisimulates ~τ f + τ fd
if n > 4t. What happens if t is larger than this threshold? Although BCG make claims for their
protocol only if n > 4t, variants of some of the properties that they are interested in continue to
hold even if n/4 ≤ t < n/3. Specifically, for each adversary A = (T, ~τT , σe) , there exists a relaxed
adversary A′ = (T, ~τ ′T , σ
′
e) such that, for all input profiles ~x, ~π
f (~x,A) and (~τ f + τ fd )(~x,A
′) are
identically distributed. This means that if n > 3t, then the only way that the adversary can affect
~πf is by preventing some agents from terminating. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 6. A protocol ~π′ (t, t′)-bisimulates ~π if it t-bisimulates ~π but the schedulers σ′e and σe
of the first and second clause of Definition 5 respectively may be relaxed for t ≥ |T | > t′.
Proposition 2. ~πf (t, t′)-bisimulates ~πfd if 3t+ t
′ < n and t ≥ t′.
As we just observed, if 4t ≤ n < 3t, then some honest agents might not terminate. However, we can
show that the BCG protocol has the property that if at least 2t+ 1 honest agents terminate, then
all the remaining honest agents terminate. This observation motivates the following definition:
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Definition 7. A protocol ~π (t, k)-coterminates if, all adversaries A = (T, ~τT , σe) with |T | ≤ t and
all input profiles ~x, in all histories of ~π with adversary A and input ~x, either all the agents not in
T terminate or strictly fewer than k agents not in T do.
Proposition 3. ~πf (t, 2t+ 1)-coterminates.
We do not prove Proposition 2 or 3 here, since we prove a generalization of them below (see
Theorem 2).
3.5 Simulating arbitrary protocols
The goal of this paper is to show that we can securely implement any interaction with a mediator,
and do so in a way that ensure the two properties discussed in Section 3.4. This is summarized in
the following theorem:
Theorem 2. For every protocol ~π + πd for n agents and a mediator, there exists a protocol ~π
′ for
n agents such that ~π′
(a) (t, t′)-bisimulates ~π if n > 3t+ t′ and t ≥ t′,
(b) (t, 2t+ 1)-coterminates if n > 3t and ~π + πd is in canonical form.
Moreover, if πd is responsive, the expected number of messages sent a history of ~π
′ is polynomial in
n and N , and linear in c, where N is the expected number of messages sent when running ~π + πd
and c is the number of gates in an arithmetic circuit that implements the mediator’s protocol.
The construction of ~π′ is given in Section 4.2 and, not surprisingly, uses many of the techniques used
by BCG. And, like BKR, if we allow an ǫ probability of error we get stronger results. We define
ǫ-t-bisimulation just like t-bisimulation (Definition 5), except that, in both clauses, the distance
between (~π + πd)(~x,A) and ~π
′(~x,A′) is less than ǫ, where the distance d between probability
measures ν and ν ′ on some finite space S is defined as d(ν, ν ′) =
∑
s∈S |ν(s)−ν
′(s)|. The definition
of ǫ-t-bisimulation and ǫ-(t, t′)-bisimulation are analogous. A protocol ǫ-(t, k)-coterminates if it
(t, k)-coterminates with probability 1− ǫ.
Theorem 3. For every protocol ~π + πd for n agents and a mediator and all ǫ > 0, there exists a
protocol ~π′ for n agents such that ~π′
(a) ǫ-(t, t′)-bisimulates ~π + πd if n > 2t+ t
′ and t ≥ t′,
(b) ǫ-(t, t+ 1)-coterminates if n > 2t and ~π + πd is in canonical form.
Moreover, if πd is responsive, ~π
′ can be implemented in such a way that the expected number of
messages when running ~π′+ πd is polynomial in n and N , and linear in c, where N is the expected
number of messages sent when running ~π + πd.
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3.6 Adversaries in asynchronous systems
Even though throughout this paper we consider the scheduler and malicious players to be separate
adversarial entities, we show next that they can coordinate. In particular, we show that malicious
players and the scheduler can communicate even though the scheduler cannot send or receive
messages.
To see that a malicious player can send information to the scheduler, it suffices to note that a player
can encode any unary string 1k by 5for instance, use the following scheme: Whenever a malicious
player sending k messages to itself. Since the scheduler knows the number of messages sent by each
player and the recipient of each message, it can “receive” such messages. patterns. The scheduler
can communicate with the malicious players by using the following scheme: Whenever a malicious
player i is scheduled, it just sends a message to itself and performs a done action. The scheduler
then delivers the message to i and schedules i again. This process is repeated until i is scheduled
before receiving the message it sent to itself. Agent i can interpret the number k of times that this
process is repeated as the unary string 1k.
Since the scheduler and the malicious players can coordinate by communicating in this fashion,
this shows that without loss of generality we can view the adversary as a single entity that controls
both the malicious parties and the scheduler simultaneously. We will assume such an adversary in
the rest of the paper.
3.7 Other models
Before proving our main results, we discuss some of the choices made in our formal model and
show that they are essentially being made without loss of generality. We start by considering our
assumption that agents perform a sequence of actions atomically when they are scheduled. We next
show that we would get theorems equivalent to the ones that we are claiming if we had instead
assumed that agents perform just a single action when they are scheduled. To prove this, we first
need the following notion:
Definition 8. A protocol ~π is N -message bounded if for all inputs and all histories, no player ever
sends more than N messages in a single turn. A protocol is message bounded if it is N -message
bounded for some N .
Proposition 4. There exist a function H from message-bounded protocols to single-action protocols
such that for all profiles ~π, the following holds:
(a) For all schedulers (resp., relaxed schedulers) σe there exists a scheduler (resp., relaxed sched-
uler) σ′e such that, for all input profiles ~x, ~π(~x, σe) and H(~π)(~x, σ
′
e) are identically distributed,
where we take H(~π) = (H(π1), . . . ,H(πn)) and we view σe and σ
′
e, respectively, as the adver-
saries (i.e., we take T = ∅).
(b) For all schedulers (resp., relaxed schedulers) σ′e there exists a scheduler (resp., relaxed sched-
uler) σe such that, for all input profiles ~x, ~π(~x, σe) and H(~π)(~x, σ
′
e) are identically distributed.
The converse of Proposition 4 is trivial, since single-action strategies are strategies.
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It follows from Proposition 4 that Theorem 2 holds even if we restrict agents to using single-action
strategies.
Proof. Intuitively, H(πi) is identical to πi, except that rather than sending a sequence of messages
when it is scheduled, i sends the messages one at a time. The scheduler σ′e is then chosen to ensure
that i is scheduled so that it sends all of its messages as if they were sent atomically. In addition
to keeping track of the messages it has sent and received, i uses the variable Ui whose value is a
sequence of mesages (intuitively, the ones that i would have sent at this point in the simulation
of πi that it has not yet sent), initally set to the empty sequence, and a binary variable next ,
originally set to 1. When i is scheduled by σ′e, H(πi) proceeds as follows: If next = 1, then i
sets Ui to the sequence of messages that it would send with πi given its current history. (If πi
randomizes, then H(πi) does the same randomization. If Ui is the empty sequence (so πi would not
send any messages at that point), i performs the action done(i), and outputs whatever it does with
π; otherwise, i sets next to 0, sends the first message in Ui to its intended recipient, and removes
this message from Ui. If next = 0, then if Ui is empty, i sets next to 1, sends done(i), and outputs
whatever it does with π; otherwise, i sends the first message in Ui to its intended recipient and
removes it from Ui.
Since ~π is message bounded, there exists an N such that ~π is N -message bounded. For part (a),
given σe, we construct σ
′
e so that it simulates σe, except that if σe schedules i, σ
′
e schedules i
repeatedly until either it observes done(i) or until i sends messages in N + 1 consecutive turns.
Since ~π is N -message bounded, it is clear that ~π(~x, σe) and H(~π)(~x, σ
′
e) are identically distributed.
Note that it is necessary for ~π to be N -message bounded, since if the scheduler schedules each
player i repeatedly until it stops sending a message during its turn, a player that keeps sending
messages would be scheduled indefinitely, and so would prevent other players from being scheduled.
For part (b), given σ′e, we construct σe so that it simulates σe. There is one issue that we have to
deal with. Whereas with σe, an agent i can send k messages each time it is scheduled, with σ
′
e, it
can send only one message when it is scheduled. The scheduler σ′e constructed from σe in part (a)
scheduled i repeatedly until it sent all the messages it did with σe. But we cannot assume that
the scheduler σ′e that we are given for part (b) does this. Thus, σe must keep track of how many
of the messages that each agent i was supposed to send the last time it was scheduled by σe have
been sent so far. To do this, σe uses variables mesi, one for each agent i, initially set to 0, such
that mesi keeps track of how many of the messages that agent i sent with σe still need to be sent
by σ′e. As we observed above, given a local history h of the scheduler where the agents use ~π and
the scheduler uses σe, there is a corresponding local history h
′ of the scheduler where the agents
use ~π′ and the scheduler uses σ′e. If, given h
′, σ′e schedules agent i with probability αi, then with
the same probability αi, σe proceeds as follows: if mesi = 0 (which means that all the messages
that i sent the last time it was scheduled have been delivered in h′), then σe schedules i, sees how
many messages i delivers according πi, and sets mesi to this number; if mesi 6= 0, then mesi is
decremented by 1 but no agent is scheduled. Again, it is clear that that ~π(~x, σe) and H(~π)(~x, σ
′
e)
are identically distributed.
BCG put further constraints on the scheduler. Specifically, they assume that, except possibly for
the first time that agent i is scheduled, i is scheduled immediately after receiving a message and
only then. That is, in our terminology, BCG assume that a rec(·, ·, i) event must be followed by a
sch(i) event, and all sch(i) events except possibly the first one occur after a rec(·, ·, i) event. We
call the schedulers that satisfy this constraint BCG schedulers.
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We now prove a result analogous to Proposition 4, from which it follows that we could have obtained
our results using a BCG scheduler.
Proposition 5. There exist a function H from strategies to strategies such that for all strategies
~π the following holds:
(a) For all schedulers (resp., relaxed schedulers) σe there exists a BCG scheduler (resp., relaxed
BCG scheduler) σ′e such that, for all input profiles ~x, ~π(~x, σe) and H(~π)(~x, σ
′
e) are identically
distributed.
(b) For all BCG schedulers (resp., relaxed schedulers) σ′e there exists a scheduler (resp., relaxed
scheduler) σe such that, for all input profiles ~x, ~π(~x, σe) and H(~π)(~x, σ
′
e) are identically
distributed.
Proof. As in Proposition 4, the idea is that σ′e simulates σe, but since σe can schedule an agent
only when it delivers a message, we have each agent i send itself special messages, denoted proceed i,
to ensure that there are always enough messages in the system. In more detail, H(πi) works as
follows. When it is first scheduled, agent i sends itself a proceed i message. Since we are considering
BCG schedulers, agent i is scheduled subsequently only when it receives a message. If it receives
a message other than proceed i, it does nothing (although the message is added to its history). If
it receives a proceed i message, then it does whatever it would do with πi given its current history
with the proceed i messages and the sch(i) events not preceeded by a proceed i message removed,
and sends itself another proceed i message.
For part (a), given σe, σ
′
e first schedules each agent once (in some arbitrary order), to ensure that
that each of them has sent a proceed i message that is available to be delivered. Given a history h
′,
σ′e considers what σe would do in the history h that results from h
′ by removing the initial sch(i)
event for each agent i, the last message that each agent i sends when it is scheduled if it sends a
message at all, and the receipt of these messages. If h′ is a history that results where the agents are
running H(~π), then the send and receive events removed are precisely those that involve proceed i.
If σe delivers a message with some probability, then σ
′
e delivers the corresponding message with the
same probability; if σe schedules an agent i with some probability, σ
′
e delivers the last proceed i that
i sent and schedules agent i with the same probability. If there is no proceed i message to deliver,
then σ′e does nothing, but our construction of H(πi) guarantees that if h
′ is a history that results
from running H(~π), then there will be such a message that can be delivered. Again, it is clear that
~π(~x, σe) and H(~π)(~x, σ
′
e) are identically distributed.
For part (b), given σ′e, the construction of σe is similar to that of Proposition 4. Again, given a local
history h of σe where the agents use ~π, there is a corresponding history h
′ of σ′e where the agents
use H(~π). If, given input h′, σ′e delivers a message with some probability p and the messages is not
a proceed i message, then σe delivers the corresponding message with probability p. If the message
is a proceed i message, then σe also schedules agent i. If σ
′
e schedules an agent i with probability
p, and in h′ this is the first time that i is scheduled, then σe schedules i with probability p and
otherwise does nothing with probability p. Yet again, it is straightforward to show that ~π(~x, σe)
and H(~π)(~x, σ′e) are identically distributed.
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4 The Proof of Theorems 2 and 3
In this section, we prove Theorems 2 and 3. Since the proofs are rather complicated, we proceed
in stages.
4.1 t-uniform VSS and CC and determinate VSS
BCG’s implementation of VSS satisfies some additional properties that they do not make use of,
but that we will need in our construction, so we outline them here.
Given a sequence I = {i1, . . . , in} of distinct honest agents, a sequence S = {s1, . . . , sn} of values,
and a secret s, we say that (I, S) is s-realizable by a VSS (resp., CC) implementation if, for that
implementation, there exists an agent i such that the the event that each agent ik computes sk as
the output of i’s invocation of VSS with secret s has nonzero probability. In other words, (I, S)
is s-realizable if S could be the output of the agents in I running VSS with secret s. (I, S) is
realizable if it is s-realizable for some s.
We say that (I ′, S′) is an s-extension of (I, S) if I is a prefix of I ′, S is a prefix of S′ and (I ′, S′) is
s-realizable. (I ′, S′) is a full s-extension if I ′ is the set of all agents. Again, we say that (I ′, S′) is
an extension of (I, S) if it is an s-extension of (I, S) for some s; it is a full extension if, in addition,
I ′ is the set of all agents. We omit the I term in each of these definitions if it is clear from context
which agent computed each of the shares in S.
BCG’s implementation of VSS and CC guarantees that if si is the share of an honest agent i after
running an invocation of VSS or CC, then there exists a polynomial p of degree t (where t is a
bound on the number of malicious agents) such that p(i) = si and p(0) is the secret shared through
VSS or computed through CC. Moreover, this polynomial p is uniformly sampled from the set of
all polynomials p′ of degree t with p′(0) = s. With BCG’s implementation of VSS and CC, a pair
(I, S) is realizable iff there exists a polynomial p of degree t such that p(ik) = sk for all k.
With this notation, we can state the properties that we need for our VSS and CC implementation.
A circuit that computes values in Fp can be securely computed by n agents if the inputs are shared
using VSS, and the addition and multiplication gates are computed using CC. At the end of the
computation, each agent has a share of the output. The first property that we require, to simplify
our proof, is that for all sets T of size at most t, the output of such a circuit is uniformly distributed
over F
|T |
p :
Definition 9. An implementation of VSS and CC is t-uniform if, for all circuits C with a single
output gate, and all sets I of honest agents with |I| ≤ t, the output of I after securely computing C
is uniformly distributed over F
|T |
p .
We actually seem to need a somewhat stronger property than t-uniformity: conditional t-uniformity
(i.e., t-uniformity conditional on the outcome of earlier CC instances). In general, a t-uniform
implementation may not satisfy conditional t-uniformity. For example, two empty circuits that
take the shares of a single VSS instance as inputs produce identical outputs, which are the the
shares of the VSS. Fortunately, it is easy to convert a circuit C to a circuit C ′ that computes
the same secret, and also satisfies conditional t-uniformity conditional on all other CC instances.
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Suppose for simplicity that C has a single output gate. We construct C ′ by having each agent i
invoke a t-uniform VSS with 0 as the secret. Agent i then computes (using CC) the product of the
secrets whose shares it receives, and adds it share of the product to the output of C. Clearly the
players will get the same value with C and C ′ after they share their shares, no matter what the
malicious players do. Also, since C ′ takes as inputs instances of VSS that are not used in any other
circuit, the output of a subset I with |I| ≤ t conditional on the output of all other CC instances is
uniformly distributed over F
|T |
p . Thus, if the implementation of VSS and CC is t-uniform, we can
assume without loss of generality that we are working with conditionally t-uniform circuits.
We also require that the shares of a set of at least t+1 honest agents uniquely determine the secret.
Definition 10. An implementation P of VSS and CC is t-determinate if
(a) P is t-resilient;
(b) P is t-uniform if there are at most t malicious agents; and
(c) for all pairs (I, S) with |I| ≥ t + 1, if (I, S) is realizable, then there exists a unique full
extension (I ′, S′) of (I, S).
BCG’s implementation of VSS is t-determinate: it is easy to check that it satisfies clauses (b) and
(c) of the definition; BCG prove that it is t-resilient. For all of our constructions, we assume that
the secret-sharing scheme used is t-determinate.
4.2 Constructing pi′
Our construction of ~π′ is similar in spirit to BCG’s constrution of ~πf . As we said earlier, what
makes our setting more complicated is that the agents send multiple messages to the mediator, and
the mediator sends multiple messages back. We will need to keep track of which messages are being
sent in response to which other messages. Moreover, to get t-bisimulation, we need to be able to
simulate all possible behaviors of the scheduler, both with ~π + πd and with ~π
′.
For ease of exposition, we begin by giving a naive construction of ~π′, which, as we later show,
does not quite satisfy all the desired properties. However, it gives the intuition for the actual
construction (which requires only a small modification of the naive construction). We now sketch
the naive construction, then give a detailed description, and then explain the minor modifications
needed to correct the problems in the naive construction. This construction may not satisfy the
bound we claimed on the expected number of messages when the mediator is responsive. We show
in Section 4.4 how to modify the construction so as to satisfy that bound.
When running π′i, each agent i simulates its counterpart running πi except that, rather than sending
and receiving messages from the mediator, i shares messages it shares and reconstructs messages
using VSS. In addition, all agents use CC to compute the mediator’s local history given the messages
shared by the agents and to compute the messages the mediator sends to the agents according to
πd, given its local history. Note that, after running CC, each agent has a share of the mediator’s
message. If this is a message sent by the mediator to agent i, then each agent sends its share to i,
so that i can reconstruct the message.
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To do the simulation, each agent i computes two sequences, {hi,k}k∈N and {h
i
d,k}k∈N. Each element
hi,k in the first sequence represents the i’s local history the kth time that i is scheduled in the
simulated interaction with the mediator, while each term hid,k of the second sequence represents i’s
share of the mediator’s local history the kth time that the mediator is scheduled in the simulated
interaction. Of course, these histories depend (in part) on how i does the simulation. In our
naive protocol, we assume that all agents get scheduled in the simulation at times corresponding to
when they get scheduled in the computation of ~π′, after getting corresponding messages. That is,
whenever i is scheduled in ~π′, it checks all the messages received from the simulated mediator since
the last time it was scheduled in ~π′, then simulates itself being scheduled in ~π + πd after receiving
exactly the same messages in the same order as it did in ~π′. This means that hi,k is constructed by
appending to hi,k−1 all messages received by i and the results of all local computations of i between
the (k − 1)st and kth time that i is scheduled in ~π′. Therefore, in the naive construction, hi,k,
which is i’s view the kth time that i is scheduled in the simulation of the computation of ~π + πd,
is also part of i’s view of the simulation the kth time that i is scheduled in ~π′. That is, if i has
been scheduled k times in ~π′, then it is also scheduled exactly k times in the simulation. As we
show later by example, this property prevents us from being able to simulate all schedulers in the
interaction with the mediator, and is precisely why the naive construction does not quite work.
That said, for now we continue to explain the naive construction.
Note that, in ~π′, i does not receive the mediator’s actual messages in its simulation; rather, it
receives shares of those messages. Agent i appends a message to hi,k−1 only at the point that the
message can be reconstructed from the shares of the message that i receives from the other agents.
After computing hi,k, i computes which messages it sends according to πi (given the history it has
simulated) and, for each such message µ, i shares µ using VSS.
Computing {hid,k}k∈N is more subtle. We must ensure that all agents agree on what messages
should be appended to hd,k to get hd,k+1; otherwise, agents will not have a consistent view of the
mediator’s history. Since, at any point in the execution of ~π′, different agents may have terminated
different invocations of VSS, this requires a little care. Let hid,0, h
i
d,1, h
i
d,2, . . . , h
i
d,k be the sequence
of shares of the mediator’s local history in the simulation computed thus far by agent i. We will
ensure that, for all k, (h1d,k, h
2
d,k, . . . , h
n
d,k) are shares of some local history hd,k of the mediator in
the computation of π being simulated, where hd,0 is the empty sequence 〈 〉 and hd,k is a prefix
of hd,k+1 (so that the mediator’s history get increasingly longer). After computing their shares of
hd,k, agents can perform a circuit computation to compute the messages the mediator sends to the
agents given local history hd,k.
We now describe the naive construction of ~π′ in more detail. As we said, because our naive
construction assumes that i is scheduled the same number of times in the simulation of πi as in the
actual computation of π′i, the kth time i is scheduled when running π
′
i, i’s history includes simulated
histories hi,0, . . . , hi,k−1 and shares of simulated histories h
i
d,0, . . . , h
i
d,k′ (note that k
′ might not be
equal to k). These simulated histories are the output of local computations, and thus are recorded
in the i’s history. In addition, i’s history keeps track of the status of all the invocations of protocols
like VSS and CC in which i participates (including results of random coin tosses, which we also
view as the outcome of computation). Note that there might be several invocations of the same
protocol that an agent is involved in at the same time; for example, an agent might invoke VSS
several times before any of them complete. To remove ambiguity, we assume that all invocations
of a protocol are labeled; for example, the first invocation of VSS invoked by agent i could be
labeled (VSS, i, 1), the second one could be labeled (VSS, i, 2)), and so on. These labels are
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communicated to the scheduler using the scheme presented in Section 3.6. Thus, we can assume
without loss of generality that the scheduler knows the labels.
If agent i is scheduled when it is in such a state, it first processes all messages received since the
last time it was scheduled. (We assume that all messages received since the last time that i was
scheduled are held in some buffer.) “Processing a message” µ consists of i playing its part in the
protocol to which µ belongs (which we assume is indicated in the label of µ); if µ is a share of
a simulated mediator message, i checks if it can reconstruct a new mediator message and, if so,
updates hi,k accordingly. After processing all of its new messages, i will have constructed hi,k+1.
Agent i checks what action(s) πi takes given input hi,k+1. If πi outputs a value v, then so does
π′i; if these actions include sending one or more messages to the mediator, then i shares those
messages using VSS instead. Finally, if possible, i computes its share of the simulated mediator’s
local history hid,k′+1 and computes (along with the other agents) which messages the mediator sends
to the agents. We now explain how this is done.
Agent i computes hid,k inductively. Clearly, hd,0, the mediator’s initially local history, is empty
(and all agents know this). To compute hid,0, i simulates a computation of VSS initiated by agent
1 (there is nothing special about agent 1 here; any other agent would do) with input the empty
sequence under the assumption that all agents are honest, and takes hid,0 to be i’s share of the
output of the computation. Since VSS is a randomized protocol, to assure consistency, all agents
must use the same random bits in this computation of VSS; we can assume that these random bits
are hardcoded into ~π′. Note that this is equivalent to just hardcoding the values of hid,0 in ~π
′, but
viewing hid,0 as the output of an invocation of VSS will be useful in the future.
Assuming that hid,k has been computed, we show how to compute h
i
d,k+1. The idea is that the
agents perform a circuit computation with inputs hid,k and all the new messages to be appended to
hd,k (note that each agent has a share of each of these inputs). It is critical when running a CC
invocation that the inputs of each honest agent are consistent with the inputs of all other honest
agents participating in the same invocation. More precisely, for all pairs of agents i and j, if i’s ℓth
input is i’s share of the message being shared in some VSS invocation (VSS, i′, j′), then j’s ℓth
input must be j’s share of the same message. It is not straightforward to ensure this, since i and
j might have completed different invocations of VSS at the time that they update hid,k and h
j
d,k
respectively.
Since this issue arises in a number of contexts, we formalize this notion of consistency. Suppose
that ~ρ is a joint protocol and ~h is a history of ~ρ. Let v be an invocation of CC in ~h in which some
honest agent i has participated. Invocation v is well-defined if the following holds:
(a) All honest agents eventually participate in v.
(b) Suppose that α has m inputs. For each ℓ with 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m, there exists an invocation vl of
VSS or CC that occurred earlier in the computation such that each honest agent i’s share of
the ℓth input of v is i’s share of the output of vℓ.
All the invocations of CC to compute hid,k+1 are well-defined in this sense, since players must use
the shares of the same secret at each gate of the CC. To ensure this, agents first agree on which
subset of messages should be appended to hd,k, then they agree on the order in which these messages
should be appended, and finally they append these messages to hd,k and compute the messages
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sent by the scheduler to the agents, which are also appended to hd,k. The protocol for extending
hid,k to h
i
d,k+1 proceeds in four phases, denoted k1, . . . , k4.
Phase k1: Let N the maximum number of messages that an honest agent sends when running ~π + πd.
Each agent i participates in nN consensus protocols in phase k1, denoted p1,1,k, . . . , pn,N,k,
where pi,j,k is intended to achieve consensus on whether i has shared its jth message success-
fully. More precisely, i’s input to consensus protocol pj,ℓ,k is 1 iff i has terminated j’s ℓth
invocation of VSS by the time i starts phase k1 and pj,ℓ,k′ has output 0 for all k
′ < k. Agent
i waits until it has terminated all the pj,ℓ,k consensus protocols it is involved with in phase
k1 before starting phase k2. If the output of some consensus protocol pj,ℓ,k is 1, then i waits
until it has also completed j’s ℓth VSS invocation in round k before starting phase k2.
Phase k2: Let pj1,ℓ1,k, pj2,ℓ2,k, . . . , pjmk ,ℓmk ,k be the consensus protocols that were used in phase k1 and
had output 1, ordered in lexicographic order (i.e., pj,ℓ,k precedes pj′,ℓ′,k′ iff j < j
′ or [j = j′
and ℓ < ℓ′]). In this phase, i coordinates with the other agents on the order that they
should append the messages shared in (VSS, j1, ℓ1), . . . , (VSS, jmk , ℓmk) to hd,k. We want
the agents to agree on the same permutation of (j1, ℓ1), . . . , (jmk , ℓmk). To do this, they use
BCG’s secure computation protocol. Each agent i inputs a permutation to the protocol; the
output is the permutation that they coordinate on. Agent i’s input to the protocol is the
unique permutation σi : [mk] −→ [mk] satisfying σi(a) < σi(b) iff i terminated (VSS, ja, ℓa)
before (VSS, jb, ℓb). Note that since i completes all the VSS invocations that are in progress in
phase k1 before it starts phase k2, i can compute this permutation. The BCG computation
returns the (unique) permutation θ satisfying θ(a) < θ(b) iff
∑
i≤n σi(a) <
∑
i≤n σi(b) or∑
i≤n σi(a) =
∑
i≤n σi(b) and a < b. Thus, roughly speaking, θ(a) < θ(b) if, on average,
agents terminated (V SS, ja, ℓa) before (V SS, jb, ℓb). Note that because of the asynchrony of
the system, we can guarantee only that at most n− t inputs will be available when computing
θ. For the remaining inputs σi we take σi to be the identity permutation.
Phase k3: Agent i uses CC to append new messages to hid,k. More precisely, it updates h
i
d,k with (VSS,
jθ(1), ℓθ(1)), ..., (VSS, jθ(mk), ℓθ(mk)) in the order determined by the permutation θ computed in
phase k2. Note that the properties of VSS and the fact that i completes all outstanding VSS
invocations in phase k1 guarantee that all honest agents have a share of all these messages
when they start phase k3. This procedure gives agent i a share that we denote h˜id,k+1 of the
mediator’s updated local history h˜d,k+1 after appending these new messages to hd,k in the
appropriate order.
Phase k4: Agent i computes hid,k+1 by using CC to append to h˜d,k+1 the message the mediator sends
to the according to πd, given input h˜d,k+1. (This can be done because all agents know the
mediator’s protocol πd.) Agent i’s input for this invocation of CC is its share h˜
i
d,k+1. Note
that each agent invokes CC only once, using it to compute all the mediator’s messages are
computed and appended them to h˜d,k+1. Agent i’s output of this invocation of CC is its share
of hid,k+1.
In phase k4 agents never actually compute (their shares, if any, of) the messages sent by the
mediator during its (k + 1)st turn; they compute only the result of appending these message to
hd,k. Later we will see how agents compute their shares of each of thesee messages individually,
using the fact that it is encoded in hd,k+1.
This protocol satisfies two important properties if n > 4t:
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Lemma 2. All honest agents eventually terminate phase k1. Moreover, for all adversaries of size
at most t and all histories, the CC protocol invoked in phase k3 is well-defined.
Proof. If the output of some consensus protocol pj,ℓ,k is 1, then the properties of VSS guarantee
that at least one honest agent had input 1. Thus, at least one honest agent terminated (VSS, j,
ℓ). The properties of VSS guarantee that all other honest agents eventually terminate this VSS
invocation as well. The properties of consensus and secure computation guarantee that all agents
use the outputs of the same VSS invocations in the same order, which means that the CC procedure
of phase k3 is well-defined for all runs.
Lemma 3. If an honest agent shares a message µ using VSS, then µ will be in hd,k for some k,
and hence each honest agent i will have a share of µ in hid,k.
Proof. If (VSS, j, ℓ) is invoked by an honest agent j, then all honest agents are guaranteed to
eventually terminate this invocation of VSS. Thus, the output of consensus protocol pj,ℓ,k (at
Phase k1) is 1 for exactly one value of k. (Note that if the output of pk,ℓ,k is 1, then all honest
players take 0 to be the input for all consensus protocols pj,ℓ,k′ with k
′ > k. This guarantees that
the output of all these protocols is 0.) This ensures that (VSS, j, ℓ) is appended to h˜d,k+1 in Phase
k3, and thus it is included in hd,k+1.
Since, by the time each agent i finishes computing hid,k, all the messages that the mediator sends to
each agent are already encoded in hd,k, it may seem that to compute the shares of these messages
individually, i would have to use an instance of CC for each one.
However, this procedure is not so straightforward since i does not know beforehand how many
messages the mediator sends or the order in which the mediator sends messages the kth time it
is scheduled (although this is also encoded in hd,k). To deal with this issue, before computing its
share of each of the mediator’s messages, i first checks if there is a message that still needs to be
sent and, if so, who the recipient is.
More precisely, let fk,ℓ be the function that takes as input a mediator’s local history and returns the
recipient of the ℓth message sent by the mediator the kth time it is scheduled; similarly, let gk,ℓ be
the function that computes the ℓth message sent by the mediator the kth time it is scheduled, given
the mediator’s history. If the mediator sends fewer than ℓ messages the kth time it is scheduled,
or if the input is not a well-defined local history, both fk,ℓ and gk,ℓ return 0. After computing hd,k,
agent i proceeds as follows for ℓ = 1, 2, . . .: it performs a circuit computation of fk,ℓ with input
hid,k. Then i broadcasts the output of this computation, and uses the values it receives from other
agents to reconstruct fk,ℓ(hd,k). If fk,ℓ(hd,k) 6= 0, i performs a circuit computation of gk,ℓ with
input hid,k and computes fk,ℓ+1(hd,k). If fk,ℓ(hd,k) = 0, then for each ℓ
′ < ℓ, i sends the output of
its circuit computation of gk,ℓ′ to agent fk,ℓ′(hd,k).
This completes the description of the naive version of ~π′. As we have been hinting, this protocol
does not quite work. The following example makes the reasons more precise.
Consider a protocol ~π + πd in which the mediator sends a STOP message to each agent the first
time it (the mediator) is scheduled. If i was scheduled before receiving the STOP message, it
outputs 0; otherwise, it outputs 1. Note that any combination of outputs is possible with ~π + πd,
depending on when the scheduler schedules the mediator and the agents. However, this is not true
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for ~π′ as we have defined it. Suppose, for example, that all agents are honest, and i is the first
agent scheduled in a history of ~π′. At this point, i is supposed to compute hi,1. Since it has not
received any messages, it will take hi,1 to be empty, and thus output 0. It follows that no history
of ~π′ can end with all agents outputting 1, which means that ~π′ does not t-bisimulate ~π + πd.
In our construction of the naive version of ~π′, each agent i calculates hk,i the kth time that i
is scheduled in ~π′. However, since computing each of hd,1, hd,2, . . . takes several turns of i, the
mediator’s history hd,k′ being computed by i during its kth turn satisfies that k
′ ≤ k. This means
that i is simulating that the mediator, at all times, has taken less turns than i, which may not be
true in the protocol with the mediator. As our example shows, some scenarios cannot be simulated
with our naive construction because of this. We deal with this problem by using the scheduler in
the simulation to determine whether an update to hi,k or h
i
d,k′ should occur when i is scheduled.
We proceed as follows. When an agent i is first scheduled, i sends two special messages, proceed i and
proceed d,0, to itself and computes hi,0 (which is just an empty history) and h
i
d,0. What i does when
it is scheduled for the ℓth time for ℓ > 1 depends on whether it has received messages of the form
proceed i and proceed d,r and messages from itself since the last time it was scheduled. Suppose that
i has computed the sequences hi,0, . . . , hi,k and h
i
d,0, . . . , h
i
d,k′ when it is scheduled for the ℓth time.
If i has not received a proceed i message since the last time it was scheduled, i does not compute
hi,k+1. If i has received a proceed i message since the last time it was scheduled, then it sends itself
another proceed i message and computes hi,k+1 as described above, using all the messages it received
since it was last scheduled and received a proceed i message Thus, i computes the next history in
the sequence {hi,k}k∈N if and only if i receives a proceed i message. Similarly, if i has not received
a message of the form proceed d,r since the last time it was scheduled, then it does not do any of
the steps needed to compute hid,k′+1. If it has received a message of the form proceed d,r message
since the last time it was scheduled, it sends itself a message of the form proceed d,r+1. (Thus, the
second component of the subscript serves a counter for the number of such messages that have been
sent.) If k′ ≤ r, then i plays its part in computing hid,k′+1. Otherwise, i does not take part in any
procedure involved in the computation of hid,k′+1; that is, i waits until it receives proceed d,r before
attempting to compute hid,r. Thus, when it is scheduled, i may take part in computing both hi,k+1
and hid,k′+1, only one of them, or neither of them. Since the scheduler must eventually deliver all
messages, all agents receive all the proceed messages that they send themselves, so eventually do
update hi,k and h
i
d,k.
This completes the construction of ~π′. In the next few subsections, we prove that ~π′ has the desired
properties.
4.3 The proof of Theorem 2(a)
We now prove Theorem 2(a). For ease of exposition, we begin by proving this result for the special
case that t′ = t, showing that ~π′ t-bisimulates ~π if n > 4t.
Proof that ~π′ t-bisimulates ~π if n > 4t: We actually prove a result slightly stronger than
Theorem 2(a): while the definition of bisimulation allows σ′e to depend on both σe ~τ
′
T and ~τ
′
T to
depend on both ~τT on σe, in our construction below, σ
′
e depends only on σe (and not on ~τ
′
T ), while
~τ ′T depends only on ~τT (and not on σe).
We begin by showing that ~π′ satisfies part (a) of the definition of bisimulation assuming that all
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players are honest. Later, we show how this proof can also be applied to the case in which a subset
T of players deviate. Given a scheduler σe in the mediator setting, we construct a scheduler σ
′
e in
the setting without the mediator as follows. Initially, σ′e schedules each agent i exactly once. Recall
that if i is honest, the first time it is scheduled it sends only proceed i and proceed d,0 messages to
itself. The point of scheduling all the agents initially is simply to get these proceed messages into
the system. From then, just as the agents do with ~π′, σ′e simulates which history he the scheduler
would have in the interaction with the mediator if the mediator and the agents used ~π+πd and the
scheduler used σe. At the beginning of the game, the scheduler sets he to the empty history. How
the scheduler updates he and what actions the scheduler performs according to σ
′
e then depend on
the form of a = σe(he) (i.e., the actions that σe would perform given history he), and on the actions
that the players perform afterwards:
• If a has the form sch(i), then it delivers i’s most recent proceed i message if there is one
to deliver, and then schedules i. Suppose that i initiates ℓ VSS instances during its turn.
Then immediately after i’s turn, σ′e appends sch(i) and ℓ snd(d, i) events to he, followed by
a done(i) event.
• If a has the form sch(d) and it is the kth time that the mediator is scheduled according to
σe, then the scheduler delivers to each agent i its proceed d,k message if there is one to deliver
and then schedules agents cyclically (1, 2, . . . , n, 1, 2, . . .) until all agents i finish computing
hid,k and their share of each of the messages sent by the mediator during its kth turn. The
scheduler also delivers to each agent i all the messages required by i for the computation of
hid,k and the shares of the mediator’s messages immediately after they are sent. Suppose that
the players determine that the mediator sends messages to j1, j2, . . . , jℓ, in that order. Then
σ′e appends sch(d), snd(j1, d), . . . , snd(jℓ, d), done(d) to he. Note that the scheduler knows
j1, . . . , jℓ, and also knows when each player i terminates the computation of h
i
d,k (given our
assumption that the scheduler knows the label of each message), since player i has terminated
the computation of hid,k if all messages related to this computation have been delivered and
no player sent further messages when it was scheduled. Thus, all players i are guaranteed to
have terminated the computation of hid,k after the scheduler has gone through a full cycle of
scheduling the players without any player sending any message required for the computation
of hid,k, for i = 1, . . . , n. (Recall that we are assuming for now that all players are honest.)
• If a has the form rec(i, d, ℓ), the scheduler delivers to i all the messages that i needs to compute
the mediator’s ℓth message to i. That is, the scheduler delivers the messages from other agents
containing the shares of the ℓth message from the mediator to i. (By our inductive hypothesis,
these messages have been sent but not yet delivered.) Then σ′e appends rec(i, d, ℓ) to σe.
• If a has the form rec(d, i, ℓ), the scheduler schedules the agents cyclically until all the agents
finish computing (V SS, i, ℓ). More precisely, the scheduler delivers only the messages involved
in protocol (V SS, i, ℓ), and does so immediately after they are sent, all of this while scheduling
the agents cyclically until all the agents stop sending messages. Then σ′e appends rec(d, i, ℓ)
to σe.
Note that σ′e does not depend on the protocol ~τT used by malicious agents. Suppose that ~π + πd
and σe are deterministic. For each input ~x, let J
k
i (~x) denote agent i’s local history at the end of
its kth turn in the unique history of (~π + πd, σe, ~x). When the agents use ~π
′, they simulate the
computation of ~π + πd. Let K
k
i (~x) denote i’s history at the end of i’s kth turn in the simulation.
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Although ~π′ randomizes, since ~π+πd and σe are deterministic, as we now show, the value of K
k
i (~x)
is independent of this randomization.
Lemma 4. For all input profiles ~x, Kki (~x) = J
k
i (~x).
We prove this lemma by proving a more general result that establishes a correspondence between
histories of ~π and histories of ~π′. In ~π′, agents attempt to simulate all the events of ~π + πd, which
include being scheduled and sending and receiving messages. By the construction of σ′e, all shares
of a message sent by the mediator are received by its recipient virtually “at the same time” (more
precisely, they are received one immediately after the other, with no other action in between).
This allows us to define a correspondence between events in a history h of ~π + πd when used with
scheduler σe and events in a history h
′ of ~π′ when used with scheduler σ′e. We start by defining the
correspondence between events that are in an agent i’s history in h and h′.
• The event that agent i is scheduled for the kth time in h corresponds to the event that i is
scheduled after receving its kth proceed i message in h
′. (Of course, i may not have received
k proceed i messages in h
′; in this case, no event in h′ corresponds to the event of i being
scheduled for the kth time in h. Similar comments hold for all the other correspondences
defined below.)
• The event that i sends its ℓth message in h corresponds to the event that i initiates its ℓth
invocation of VSS in h′.
• The event that i receives the ℓth message sent by the mediator during its kth turn in h
corresponds to the event that i receives a share of gk,ℓ(hd,k) in h
′. Note that gk,ℓ encodes the
ℓth message sent by the simulated mediator during its kth turn given its local history hd,k.
Since the mediator is being simulated by all agents, events in the mediator’s history in h do not
correspond to single events in h′. Rather, they correspond to exactly n events, one for each agent.
Scheduler σ′e guarantees that these n events occur consecutively in h
′.
• The event that the mediator is scheduled for the kth time in h corresponds to the set of events
in h′ consisting of agent i being scheduled after receiving a proceed d,k message, for each agent
i.
• The event that the mediator sends the ℓth message to agent j during its kth turn in h
corresponds to the set of events in h′ consisting of each agent i computing its share of gk,ℓ(hd,k)
(which encodes the ℓth message sent by the simulated mediator during its kth turn) and
sending it to agent j.
• The event that the mediator receives j’s ℓth message in h corresponds to the set of events in
h′ consisting of each agent i terminating the ℓth VSS invocation initiated by j.
Note that we have not included the done(i) events in the correspondence. Even though such events
are needed to define then end of agenti’s turn, they are redundant, since they come immediately
before a sch(i) in i’s local history.
An event in a history h′ of ~π′ is a simulation event if it could correspond to some event in another
history h of ~π. More precisely, an event e in history h′ is a simulation event if there exists a history h
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of ~π and an event e in h such that e′ corresponds to e. Two histories h and h′ of ~π and ~π′ correspond
if all non-done events in i’s history in h correspond to some event in h′, all non-done events in the
mediator’s history in h correspond to n events in h, one for each agent, each simulation event in h′
corresponds to some event in h, and the order of corresponding events in each agent i’s history is
preserved; more precisely, if e1 and e2 are two non-done events in i’s (resp., the mediator’s) history
in h, and e′1 and e
′
2 are the events that correspond to e1 and e2 in i’s history in h
′, then e1 precedes
e2 in h iff e
′
1 precedes e
′
2 in h
′.
Lemma 4 follows from the following lemma, which is almost immediate from the construction of σ′e
and π′. Although there are a number of histories in ~π′ with scheduler σ′e and input ~x due to the
randomization used in protocols such as VSS and CC, all of them correspond to the unique history
in ~π when the scheduler plays σe and players have input profile ~x.
Lemma 5. For all input profiles ~x, the unique history h of where the agents use ~π with scheduler
σe and input profile ~x corresponds to all the histories h
′ of where the agents use ~π′ with scheduler
σ′e and input profile ~x.
Note that Lemma 5 implies Lemma 4, since it states that agents simulate receiving and sending
messages in exactly the same order with ~π′ as they do with ~π + πd. Moreover, if the protocol is
deterministic, the contents of those messages are uniquely determined.
If ~π+πd or σe involve randomization, we can assume that the agents and mediator toss all the coins
they need at the beginning (before they are first scheduled) and then use the outcomes of these coin
tosses for their decisions. Fixing the outcome of such coin tosses makes the protocols deterministic,
and an analogous argument to that used for Lemma 4 for each of the possible sequences of coin
tosses guarantees that the agents’ outputs are identically distributed in ~π + πd and in ~π
′. Since
(~π−T , ~τT ) is just another protocol, it immediately follows from Lemma 4 that for all input profiles
~π(~x, (T, ~τT , σe)) and ~π
′(~x, (T, ~τ ′T , σ
′
e)) are identically distributed for all possible protocols ~τT for the
malicious agents. This completes the proof that part (a) of the definition of “bisimulates” holds.
We now prove that part (b) of the definition of “bisimulates” holds. For this proof, we assume
without loss of generality that malicious agents output their local history when running ~τ ′T , since
any output must be a function of their local history. For ease of exposition, we begin by giving the
highlights of the construction of ~τ and σe, given ~π
′, ~τ ′T , and σ
′
e; we later present the construction in
more detail. The idea for constructing ~τT and σe is that the adversary simulates what would occur
if honest agents use ~π′−T , malicious agents use ~τ
′
T , and the scheduler uses σ
′
e. If the adversary in
the protocol with the mediator knew the input ~x−T of honest agents, the adversary could perform
the simulation before the protocol starts, and have malicious agents output the local history they
have in the simulation, regardless of their history in ~π. However, the adversary does not know the
honest agents’ inputs. Thus, the adversary does the simulation assuming honest agents have some
fixed input, which we take to be ~0−T . The following lemma makes precise the sense in which using
~0−T rather than ~x−T is “safe”.
Lemma 6. Let J(~π,A, ~x) be a random a random variable whose values are the values of the
malicious agents, when the honest agents use ~π, given input profile ~x, and adversary A = (T, τT , σe).
Let ~σV SS and ~σCC be the implementation of VSS and CC, respectively, in a t-resilient secret-sharing
scheme. Then for all adversaries A = (T, ~τT , σe) and input profiles ~x and ~x
′, we have
• Je((~σV SS), A, ~x, ) and J
e((~σV SS), A, (~x−T , ~x
′
−T )) are identically distributed;
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• Je((~σCC), A, ~x, ) and J
e((~σCC), A, (~x−T , ~x
′
−T )) are identically distributed;
Lemma 6 implies that the adversary’s history in an invocation of VSS and CC is independent of
the actual inputs of the honest agents. This follows easily from the definition of t-resilience, since
otherwise the adversary could deduce information about the honest agents’ inputs given its local
history. This means that much of the simulation can be performed by the adversary without having
to know which inputs honest agents are using. Indeed, there are only three types of actions or
decisions of an honest agent i that both depend on the honest agents’ inputs and can affect the
adversary’s local history:
(a) how many time i invokes VSS after receiving a proceed i message;
(b) what values i broadcasts after computing its share of fk,ℓ(hd,k);
(c) what values i sends to an agent j ∈ T after computing gk,ℓ(hd,k) (if fk,ℓ(hd,k) = j).
Clearly, the number of times that an honest agent invokes VSS affects the adversary’s simulated
history. For (b) and (c), if the adversary assumes that the honest agents have arbitrary inputs, the
values received by agents in T will also be arbitrary, as opposed to being correlated to the agents’
inputs (e.g., the messages sent by the mediator can depend in the messages received by honest
agents, which ultimately depend on their inputs).
We show next that (a), (b) and (c) are the only decisions and actions taken by honest agents
that the adversary cannot simulate. Suppose that the adversary had an oracle that could tell the
adversary the number of times each honest agent i invokes VSS each time i is scheduled, and the
values of each instance of fk,ℓ(hd,k) and gk,ℓ(hd,k) (if fk,ℓ(hd,k) ∈ T ). Then the adversary could
perform its simulation even without the honest agents’ inputs: it could run its simulation with
arbitrary inputs for honest agents. Whenever an honest agent i is scheduled after receiving a
proceed i message, it could ask the oracle how many times i invokes VSS, and could simulate i
performing that many invocations of VSS with arbitrary inputs, even without knowing the actual
local history of i. Similarly, whenever honest agents have to broadcast or send an agent in T their
share of fk,ℓ(hd,k) or gk,ℓ(hd,k), the adversary could ask the oracle what value fk,ℓ(hd,k) (resp.,
gk,ℓ(hd,k)) takes in the actual history of ~π
′. In its simulation, the adversary takes the set of shares
that the honest agents broadcast or sent to agents in T to be fk,ℓ(hd,k)-realizable or gk,ℓ(hd,k)-
realizable, respectively, regardless of the local history of the honest agents in the simulation (we
will show when we present the more detailed construction how this can be done in such a way
that the adversary’s local history in its simulation is still consistent, despite the fact that in the
simulation, honest agents may send different shares than the ones they computed). It follows from
Lemma 6 that the adversary’s local histories in the simulation with this oracle and its histories in
a real interaction where honest players play ~π′ with input ~x are identically distributed.
Unfortunately, the adversary does not have access to such an oracle. However, by the construction
of ~π′, the values given by the oracle can be deduced from the history of the protocol with the
mediator that the adversary is simulating, even without the benefit of an oracle. Specifically, if, for
all honest agent i, each of the simulated histories hi,k in ~π
′ is equal to i’s local history at the end of
i’s kth turn in ~π, and if each of the histories hd,k is equal to the local history of the mediator at the
end of its kth turn; the number of times that an honest agent i invokes VSS after receiving its kth
proceed i message but before receiving its (k+1)st proceed i message in ~π
′ is the number of messages
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sent by i during its kth turn in ~π; fk,ℓ(hd,k) is the recipient of the ℓth message sent by the mediator
during its kth turn; and gk,ℓ(hd,k) is the content of this message (which is known by the adversary
if its recipient is in T ). Thus, if the adversary could schedule agents and deliver messages in ~π
in such a way that, for each agent i and all k, the local histories hi,k in the adversary’s simulation
are the same as the local history of i in ~π at the end of i’s kth turn, then we could dispense with
the oracle. However, because the adversary does not know in the honest agents’ input profiles, it
cannot in general do this.
Fortunately, we do not need quite this much. Recall that the aim of the simulation is for the
adversary to compute what history it would have in ~π′. Since |T | < n/4, Lemma 6 implies that
the local histories of the agents in T and of the scheduler have the same distribution, independent
of which values are being shared by honest agents. Therefore, to deduce the values given by the
oracle, it suffices that the adversary schedules agents and delivers messages in ~π in such a way that,
for each agent i 6∈ T , the local histories hi,k in the adversary’s simulation are the same as the local
history of i in ~π at the end of i’s kth turn, except possibly for i’s input and the content of the
messages sent and received by i. This means that the local histories hi,k and i’s local histories in ~π
at the end of its kth turn should consist of exactly the same sch, snd , rec, comp, and done events,
and may differ only in the content of their rec and snd events. A more detailed construction of the
adversary (T, ~τT , σe) is given next.
For simplicity, we assume the adversary is a single entity that controls both the scheduler and
the subset T of malicious agents. Given ~π, ~τ ′T , σ
′
e, and ~xT , the adversary (T, ~τT , σe). starts by
performing a simulation of a history of (~π′−T , ~τ
′
T , σ
′
e,~0/(T,~xT )) using additional variables αi,k,ℓ and
βi,k,ℓ with i, k, ℓ ∈ N , all initially set to a special value ⊥. Whenever one of the following events
occur in the simulation, the adversary proceeds as described below.
(1) An agent i 6∈ T is scheduled after receiving a proceed i message: In this case, σe schedules i in
~π. If i sends ℓ messages when it is scheduled in ~π, then in its simulation, i is scheduled and
invokes VSS ℓ times with input 0, regardless of i’s local history i in the simulation.
(2) An honest agent i 6∈ T terminates the share phase of (V SS, j, ℓ), with j ∈ T : Since n > 4t,
the properties of VSS guaranteee that at least 2t+1 honest agents in the simulation will also
compute their share of (V SS, j, ℓ), and that these shares reconstruct a unique value mesj,ℓ.
The scheduler σe then schedules agent j in ~π, and j sends message mesj,ℓ to the mediator,
tagged with label ℓ.
(3) An agent i 6∈ T is the first honest agent to compute the permutation θk computed in phase k2.
Let mk be the cardinality of the domain of of θk, and let (V SS, j1, ℓ1), . . . , (V SS, jmk , ℓmk)
be the invocations of VSS that are included in hd,k in Phase k1. The scheduler σe delivers
agent jθk(1)’s ℓθk(1)th message, ..., and jτ(n)’s ℓθk(n)th message to the mediator in ~π, and then
schedules the mediator.
(4) An agent i 6∈ T terminates the invocation of CC instance for fk,ℓ(hd,k). If the additional
variable αi,k,ℓ 6= ⊥, then the adversary continues its simulation under the assumption that i’s
output of the CC invocation is αi,k,ℓ rather than the actual output. Otherwise, since n > 4t,
the assumption made at the end of Section 3.2.6 guarantee that there is a set I of at least
2t+ 1 honest agents in the simulation that have already computed their shares of fk,ℓ(hd,k).
Let {si,k,ℓ}i∈[n] be the unique full extension of the shares of the agents in I, and let jk,ℓ
be either the receiver of the mediator’s ℓth message during its kth turn or 0 if the mediator
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didn’t send ℓ messages during its kth turn. The adversary samples uniformly at random a full
jk,ℓ-extension {s
′
i,k,ℓ}i∈[n] of {si,k,ℓ}i∈T and sets αi,k,ℓ to s
′
i,k,ℓ for all i ∈ [n]. The adversary
continues its simulation by assuming that i’s output of the CC invocation is αi,k,ℓ rather than
si,k,ℓ.
(5) An agent i 6∈ T terminates the CC invocation for gk,ℓ(hd,k), and k and ℓ are such that the
mediator sent at least ℓ messages the kth time it was scheduled in ~π, and the recipient jk,ℓ of
the ℓth message sent by the mediator the kth time it is scheduled in ~π is in T . If βi,k,ℓ 6= ⊥,
then the adversary continues its simulation by assuming that i’s output of the CC invocation
is βi,k,ℓ rather than the actual output. Otherwise, let mesk,ℓ be the content of the ℓth message
that the mediator sends the kth time it is scheduled (note that this value is known by jk,ℓ,
and hence by the adversary). Since n > 4t, by the properties of CC, there is a set I with at
least 2t+1 honest agents that have computed their shares of gk,ℓ(hd,k) in the simulation. Let
{s′′i,k,ℓ}i∈[n] be the unique full extension of the shares of agents in I. The adversary samples
uniformly at random a full mesk,ℓ-extension of {s
′′
i,k,ℓ}i∈T and sets βi,k,ℓ to s
′′
i,k,ℓ for each
i ∈ [n]. Then the adversary continues its simulation by assuming that i’s output of the CC
invocation is βi,k,ℓ rather than s
′′
i,k,ℓ.
(6) An agent i 6∈ T reconstructs gk,ℓ(hd,k) using VSS for some k and ℓ. In this case, the scheduler
σe delivers the ℓth message sent by the mediator to i the kth time the mediator was scheduled.
Note this construction for the adversary is well defined. The first and second clause guarantee
that if an agent terminated (V SS, i, ℓ) in the adversary’s simulation, then agent i sent a message
tagged with label ℓ in the corresponding history of ~π. Also, whenever an honest agent finishes
the computation of fk,ℓ(hd,k) or gk,ℓ(hd,k), it must have terminated the computation of θk, and (3)
guarantees that the mediator has been scheduled at least k times (as needed for (4) and (5)).
The first step in proving that this construction of ~τT and σe satisfies clause (b) of the definition
of t-bisimulation is to show that the adversary can simulate how many times each honest agent
invokes VSS in ~π′. Recall that honest agents may initiate a new invocation of only after receiving
a proceed message. Given a history h in ~π′, let ai,k(h) denote the number of times that agent i
invokes VSS after receiving its kth proceed i message but before receiving the (k + 1)st proceed i
message. Let ((ai,k(h))i 6∈T )k∈N be the sequence of all such values, arranged lexicographically first
by their k index and then by their i index. The following lemma, which follows immediately from
the construction of ~τT and σe, shows that the distribution of these random variables is the same in
~π′ and in the adversary’s simulation.
Lemma 7. Fix T ⊆ [n] with |T | < n/4 and an input profile ~x. Let H be the distribution over
histories when agents use (~π′−T , ~τ
′
T ) with scheduler σ
′
e and input ~x, and let H
′ be the distribution
over histories in the adversary’s simulation when agents use (~π−T , ~τT ) with scheduler σe and input
~x. Then S(H)T and S(H
′)T are identically distributed.
As we pointed out before, one of the only decisions made by honest agents that the adversary
cannot simulate without additional information is the number of invocations of VSS that they
perform when they are scheduled. Thus, this lemma shows that honest agents behave exactly
the same in ~π′ and in the adversary’s simulation except for the values that they share using VSS
and the values of fk,ℓ(hd,k) and gk,ℓ(hd,k) sent to other players. However, by Lemma 6, exactly
which values are shared using VSS does not affect the adversary’s local history in its simulation.
Therefore, the only events that might differ between the adversary’s local history in ~π′ and its
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local history in its simulation in ~π are those in which agents in T receive shares of fk,ℓ(hd,k) and
gk,ℓ(hd,k) from honest agents. In ~π
′, fk,ℓ(hd,k) and gk,ℓ(hd,k) are the recipient and the content of
the mediator’s ℓth message during its kth turn, which are computed using CC with the simulated
mediator’s local history hd,k as input. Since the adversary assumes in its simulation that the values
that honest agents share using VSS are all 0, the local histories hd,k that honest agents compute
in the adversary’s simulation would not follow the same distribution as their local histories if they
used ~π′ with their actual input. Thus, the shares of fk,ℓ(hd,k) and gk,ℓ(hd,k) would also have a
different distribution.
However, much as when dealing with VSS invocations, the adversary can use the mediator’s actions
in ~π as feedback for its simulation, and simulates that the shares of fk,ℓ(hd,k) and gk,ℓ(hd,k) that
honest agents send to players in T define secrets jk,ℓ and µk,ℓ respectively, regardless of their local
history, where jk,ℓ and µk,ℓ are the recipient and the content of the mediator’s ℓth message during
its kth turn in ~π (note that the adversary does this for gk,ℓ(hd,k) whenever jk,ℓ ∈ T , since otherwise
it does not know the content of this message). By construction, this simulation proceeds in such
a way that the shares that honest players send are “consistent” with the shares of fk,ℓ(hd,k) and
gk,ℓ(hd,k) that players in T could compute from their local history, in the sense that the shares
of fk,ℓ(hd,k) and gk,ℓ(hd,k) sent by honest players together with the shares of those functions that
players in T could compute are jk,ℓ-realizable and µk,ℓ-realizable respectively. Note that if this
weren’t the case, the simulated local history of players in T could not occur if honest players played
~π′. The following lemma shows the correctness of this construction.
Given a history h of ~π′, let RTk,ℓ(h) denote the subsequence of rec events in hT of messages from
agents not in T involving the computation of fk,ℓ(hd,k) and gk,ℓ(hd,k), using CC, the broadcast
procedures for the shares of fk,ℓ(hd,k), and the messages in which they send their shares of gk,ℓ(hd,k).
Lemma 8. Fix T ⊆ [n] with n > 4|T | and an input profile Let ~πh(~x,A) be the distribution
over histories when agents use ~π with adversary A and input ~x, and let A := (T, ~τT , σe)) and
A′ := (T, ~τ ′T , σ
′
e). Then R
T
k,ℓ(~π
′
h(~x,A
′) and RTk,ℓ(~πh(~x,A)) are identically distributed for all k, ℓ,
where RTk,ℓ(~πh(~x,A)) is the distribution on sequences of rec events defined naturally by composing
~πh(~x,A) and R
T
k,ℓ.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is analogous to that given by Canetti in his proof of Lemma 4.31
[Canetti 1996, p. 91].
As we noted in Section 4.1, we implement CC in such a way that there is no correlation between
the shares of different circuit computations. Thus, Lemma 8 can be easily generalized to show that
(Rk,ℓ(H))k,ℓ∈N and (Rk,ℓ(H
′))k,ℓ∈N are identically distributed. This, together with Lemma 6 and
Lemma 7 implies Theorem 2(a) in the case that t = t′.
We now prove that ~π′ (t, t′)-bisimulates ~π in the general setting, where 3t+ t′ < n and t ≥ t′. Let
t′′ = t − t′. Given a protocol ~π for n agents, consider the protocol (~π, η) for n + t′′ agents, where
the first n agents use ~π, while the last t′′ agents use the null protocol, that is, they never send
any messages. Given an adversary A′ = (T, ~τ ′T , σ
′
e) in the setting with n agents (and no mediator),
consider an adversary A′′ = (T, ~τ ′T , σ
′′
e ) in the setting with n + t
′′ agents in which σ′′e is a relaxed
scheduler that acts just like σ′e, except that it might schedule agents in {n+1, . . . , n+ t
′′}, although
it never delivers their messages (note that since σ′′e does not deliver the messages sent by the last
t′′ agents, τ ′ is well defined even in the setting with n+ t′′ agents). Since 4t < n+ t′′, following the
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same construction as in the case that t = t′, there exists an adversary A = (T, ~τT , σe) such that
(~π + η)(~x,A′′) = (~π + η)(~x,A)
for all input profiles ~x. Note that the scheduler σe resulting from this construction is in fact a
relaxed scheduler: since some of the VSS-share and CC instances in (~π+ η)′ are not guaranteed to
terminate if σ′′e is relaxed, some messages might not be delivered by σe.
Consider a scheduler σ′′′e in ~π that acts like σe except that it does not schedule agents n+1, . . . , n+t.
By construction,
~π(~x, (T, ~τT , σ
′′′
e )) = (~π + η)(~x,A)
and
~π′(~x,A′) = (~π + η)(~x,A′′)
so
~π(~x, (T, ~τT , σ
′′′
e )) = ~π
′(~x,A′)
as desired.
Finally, it remains to show that if |T | ≤ t′, σ′′′e is not relaxed. Given the adversaries A
′ and A′′
defined above, consider an adversaryA∗ := (~τ∗T ′ , σ
∗
e) for (~π+η)
′, such that T ′ = T∪{n+1, . . . , n+t′′},
agents i ∈ T use ~τ ′i , agents in {n + 1, . . . , n + t
′′} send no messages, and σ∗e acts just like σ
′′
e . By
construction,
(~π + η)′(~x,A∗) = (~π + η)(~x,A′′)
In this case, σ∗e is not a relaxed scheduler, since agents in {n + 1, . . . , n + t
′′} never send any
messages. Moreover, since |T ′| = |T |+ t′′ < t, it follows that 4|T ′| < n, and reasoning analogous to
the previous case shows that there exists an adversary A = (T, ~τ , σ′′′e ) such that
~π(~x,A) = ~π′(~x,A′).
However, in this case, σ′′′e is not relaxed, since σ
′′
e was not.
4.4 Bounding the number of messages
As mentioned in Section 3.2.7, our construction of ~π′ does not bound the number of messages
sent. To see this, note that players compute hd,k each time that the mediator is scheduled in
the simulation. Since the number of times that the mediator can be scheduled is unbounded, the
number of messages sent in ~π′ can be unbounded as well.
If the mediator πd is responsive, we show how we can modify the construction of Section 3.2.7 so
as to bound the number of messages. The idea is that, since πd is responsive, agents don’t need
to simulate all the mediator’s histories; it suffices to simulate only the histories in which that the
mediator receives at least one message at every turn except possibly the first one. Note that this
bounds the number of mediator turns that the players simulate by N , and thus guarantees that
the expected number of messages in ~π′ is polynomial in n and N since all primitives satisfy this
property. To do this, agents run Section 4.3 with a simple modification in the computation of
hd,k for k > 1. Instead of running a consensus protocol pj,ℓ,k for each VSS invocation (VSS, j, ℓ),
players use an ACS computation Ck with parameter m = 1, in which the accumulative set Ui of
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player i consists of the pairs (j, ℓ) such that i has terminated (VSS, j, ℓ) but (j, ℓ) was not in any
core set Ck′ with k
′ < k. Players then continue Phases k2 to k4 as usual, but take pj,ℓ,k = 1 iff
(j, ℓ) ∈ Ck. Since the players take the parameter m to be 1, |Ck| ≥ 1; thus, it is guaranteed that in
the simulation, the mediator has received at least one message at its kth turn.
The proof of correctness of this modified construction is identical to that given in Section 4.3 for
the original construction.
4.5 The proof of Theorem 2(b)
If ~π+ πd is in canonical form, the construction of ~π
′ is as in Section 3.2.7, except that if an honest
player reconstructs a message containing “STOP”, it terminates.
Suppose that a set I of at least 2t + 1 honest agents terminate. This means that all agents in I
have computed their share of each of the mediator’s messages. Thus, for each message µ sent by
the mediator, each honest agent i will eventually receive a subset SIµ of shares such that (I, S
I
µ)
is µ-realizable. Recall that we assumed (at the end of Section 3.2) that the secret-sharing scheme
used in π′ is t-determinate. Thus, this subset of shares suffices for each honest agent to uniquely
reconstruct µ, even with an adversary of size t: if a pair (I, S) with |I| ≤ 2t + 1 is µ-realizable,
at least t+ 1 agents from I are honest, and their shares uniquely define µ (and each of the other
agents’ shares). Thus, receiving a realizable set of at least 2t + 1 shares uniquely determines the
secret being shared.
4.6 The proof of Theorem 3
The protocol ~π′ for Theorem 3 is analogous to that for Theorem 2, except that we use the VSS and
CC implementations of BKR instead of those of BCG. The proof of Theorem 3(a) is then identical
to that of Theorem 2(a). Since it can be easily shown that the VSS and CC implementations
constructed by BKR ǫ-(t, t+ 1)-coterminate, Theorem 3(b) follows.
5 Conclusion
We have shown how to simulate arbitrary protocols securely in an asynchronous setting in a “bidi-
rectional” way (as formalized by our notion of bisimulation). This bidirectionality plays a key role
our application of these results in a companion paper; we believe that it might turn out to be useful
in other settings as well. While this property holds for the BCG function simulation, proving that
we can simulate arbitrary protocols so that it holds seems to be nontrivial.
Our construction may not be message-efficient in the general case. However, for responsive me-
diators, a small modification allows us to bound the expected number of messages by a function
that is polynomial in the number of players n and the maximum number of messages N sent in
the setting with the mediator, and linear in c, the number of gates in a circuit that implements the
mediator’s protocol. It is still an open problem whether all protocols ~π + πd can be implemented
in a way that the expected number of messages sent by honest agents is bounded by some function
of n, N , and c.
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